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Approved:  _______________________________________________ 
Dr. Steven Matsunaga 
 
I examine whether recently required Risk Factor update disclosures in quarterly 
reports provide investors with timely information regarding potential future negative 
outcomes.  Specifically, I examine whether Risk Factor updates in 10-Q filings are 
associated with negative abnormal returns at the time the updates are disclosed and whether 
quarterly updates are followed by negative earnings shocks.  I find that firms presenting 
updates to their Risk Factor disclosures have lower abnormal returns around the filing date 
of the 10-Q relative to firms without updates, although I find little evidence to suggest that 
the strength of this relationship is positively associated with the level of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors.  Using analyst forecasts and a cross-sectional 
model to forecast earnings as measures of expected earnings prior to the release of Risk 
Factor updates, I find that firms with updates to their Risk Factors section have lower future 
unexpected earnings.  I also find that firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to 
experience future extreme negative earnings forecast errors.  These findings suggest that 
the recent disclosure requirement mandated by the SEC was successful in generating timely 
disclosure of bad news.  However, I also find some evidence that firms with updates to 
their Risk Factors section have stronger future positive performance shocks relative to 
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firms without Risk Factor Updates, consistent with firms that disclose Risk Factor updates 
also having greater upside potential. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Effective December 1, 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) mandated filers to disclose “Risk Factors” in their annual and quarterly reports.  
The stated purpose of this new requirement was to “further enhance the contents of 
Exchange Act reports and their value in informing investors and the markets” (SEC 
2005).  The SEC states that the Risk Factors disclosed should “describe the most 
significant factors that may adversely affect the issuer’s business, operations, industry or 
financial position, or its future financial performance” (SEC 2004).  However, because 
firms have some latitude in complying with the mandated disclosure requirement, the 
degree to which the disclosures convey information consistent with the SEC’s intent 
remains uncertain.  This is consistent with the SEC’s recent concerns that Risk Factor 
regulation may need to be revised to increase its usefulness (Johnson 2010).  Ultimately, 
whether the mandated disclosure requirement generates more timely disclosure of 
negative information depends on management’s assessment of the trade-off between the 
expected costs from enforcement against the perceived costs of disclosing information 
about uncertain, negative outcomes.  Thus, it is not clear that the regulation will motivate 
managers to disclose private information about potential negative outcomes.  To provide 
evidence on this issue, I examine whether updates to Risk Factor disclosures in 10-Q 
filings are negatively associated with short window stock returns and whether the 
strength of the market reaction is positively associated with the degree of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors.  In addition, I examine whether updates of 
Risk Factor disclosures are followed by negative earnings shocks. 
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Although the SEC regulation applies to both annual and quarterly reports, the 
reporting requirements differ across the two documents.  Annual reports provide 
investors with a general summary of all Risk Factors facing the firm, while quarterly 
reports should only contain updates to those Risk Factors (including the addition of new 
Risk Factors facing the firm).  Thus, while disclosures in the 10-K filing should provide 
information about levels of existing problems facing the firm, quarterly reports should 
express changes in expected potential negative outcomes.  Because I am interested in 
whether the recent disclosure requirement provides timely reporting of potential adverse 
outcomes, in this study I focus on quarterly reports.  In addition, anecdotal evidence in 
the popular press suggests that investors may be overlooking information in the Risk 
Factors section of quarterly reports (Greenberg, 2007; Greenberg, 2008).     
 In deciding whether to disclose uncertain adverse outcomes, management weighs 
the costs of disclosure against the potential penalties faced from the SEC’s enforcement 
of the disclosure regulation and the probability of shareholder litigation.  Management’s 
withholding of bad news is consistent with disclosure theory (Verrecchia 2001; Dye 
2001), survey evidence (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005), and empirical evidence 
(Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009; Green, Hand, and Penn 2011).  These studies suggest 
that managers have incentives to withhold bad news to maximize their personal wealth 
when there is the possibility that the potential negative outcome will not be realized.  The 
disclosure of possible negative outcomes could reduce stock price, thereby reducing 
management’s wealth and labor market value (Kothari et al. 2009; Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2007).  While managers have incentives to preempt bad news by disclosing 
realized negative outcomes, (Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Baginski, Hassell, 
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and Kimbrough 2002), the required disclosure of Risk Factors, by definition, relate to 
uncertain outcomes.  Consistent with this distinction, Graham et al. (2005) find that 
managers delay disclosing potential bad news.  Manager’s survey responses in Graham et 
al. (2005) suggest that they would withhold disclosure of potential negative outcomes due 
to hope that the firm’s position will improve, saving them from ever having to disclose 
the information.   
 As a result, managers are likely to withhold disclosing information regarding 
uncertain negative outcomes.  To provide additional incentives to disclose such 
information on a timely basis, the SEC regulation imposes penalties for failing to disclose 
a material risk factor.  Anecdotal evidence suggests this penalty can be severe.  A class 
action lawsuit filed in 2009 alleges that potential future material deteriorations in 
Countrywide Financial Corporation’s loan portfolio were not appropriately identified in 
the company’s Risk Factors section until the period in which a material impairment 
charge was announced.  The settlement in this case was for $624 million. 1    
 However, it is not clear that the potential cost of an enforcement action is 
sufficient to motivate management to disclose material Risk Factors.  The SEC is only 
likely to impose a penalty on management for the non-disclosure of a material risk factor 
after a negative outcome is realized and they are able to show that the manager had 
access to information that was withheld.  Although prior research suggests that managers 
are likely to preemptively disclose realized bad news as the fear of litigation increases 
(Skinner 1997; Graham et al. 2005), given the uncertainty inherent in Risk Factors, it is 
                                                 
1
 This settlement was approved on March 10, 2011 and released liability of several top Countrywide 
executives, including the former CEO.  $24 million of the settlement will be paid by KPMG.  The total 
amount of the settlement is one of the largest securities fraud settlements in U.S. history.  See 
http://securities.stanford.edu/1038/CFC_01/ for additional information. 
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not clear that the threat of fines and penalties will be sufficient to overcome the tendency 
of managers to withhold the disclosure of possible negative outcomes.    
Following the discussion above, the impact on the information environment of the 
SEC requirement to disclose updates to Risk Factors in a 10-Q filing is an empirical 
question.  If the requirement leads to additional disclosure of material risk factors, the 
market should respond to the disclosure by lowering the expected value of the future cash 
flows of the firm and incorporate the information into stock price.  This should lead to 
negative returns after the 10-Q filing, and the strength of this association is likely to 
depend on the extent of information asymmetry between managers and investors.  When 
there is more information in the public domain regarding possible negative future 
outcomes prior to the filing of the 10-Q, the market reaction at the time of the disclosure 
should be dampened.   
The disclosure of material risk factors in the 10-Q should also be associated with 
negative earnings shocks when those unfavorable outcomes are realized.  I therefore test 
whether firms that provide Risk Factor updates experience a negative shift in the 
distribution of future unexpected earnings relative to firms that do not provide updates, as 
well as whether firms that provide Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience 
future extreme negative earnings shocks.  These tests provide evidence as to whether the 
disclosures are associated with an increased probability of adverse outcomes and the 
timing of those negative outcomes.  
Two concurrent working papers that study Risk Factor disclosures in annual 
reports conclude that annual Risk Factor disclosures are informative to investors 
(Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele 2011; Huang 2010).  However, there are a 
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few key differences between their studies and mine.  Huang (2010) limits his analysis to a 
small set of risk factors and finds mixed evidence that some key words are related to 
changes in risk and financial performance.  My study effectively picks up where Huang 
(2010) leaves off, by focusing on whether Risk Factor updates convey useful information 
to investors.  Second, Campbell et al. (2011) generally focus on whether annual Risk 
Factor disclosures convey information about general uncertainty/volatility, whereas in 
this study I focus on whether Risk Factor updates contain information about specific 
uncertainty surrounding negative outcomes.  Finally, it is not clear whether the findings 
related to disclosure in annual reports are generalizable to disclosure in quarterly reports.  
Unlike annual reports which must contain a Risk Factors section, the SEC allows 
managers to omit the Risk Factors section in the 10-Q if there have been no material 
updates, which may differentiate compliance in quarterly reporting from annual reporting 
by shifting the perceived costs of withholding an uncertain adverse outcome.  In addition, 
quarterly reports are reviewed rather than audited and must be filed more quickly than 
annual reports, which may create additional managerial reporting discretion in this 
setting.  Given the SEC is contemplating revising the Risk Factor disclosure standards 
(Johnson 2010), this study sheds light on whether the requirement for quarterly reporting 
has incremental value.    
I test three hypotheses related to my predictions.  First, I examine whether Risk 
Factor updates in the 10-Q lead to reductions in the market’s expectations regarding the 
firm’s future cash flows.  Second, I examine whether the changes in market expectations 
are attenuated by differences in the information environment.  Finally, I examine whether 
Risk Factor updates in the 10-Q are followed by future negative earnings shocks.   
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I use the Python programming language to collect Risk Factor disclosures and 
construct two alternative measures to capture the information content of a Risk Factor 
update.2  The first is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if a firm discloses an 
update to their annual Risk Factor disclosure in their 10-Q filing.  The second is a 
continuous measure that counts the number of key words included in the Risk Factor 
disclosure.  The key words are defined using the list of 37 terms suggested by 
Balakrishnan and Bartov (2008) to capture “fundamental risk.”  The intuition behind the 
use of this word count is that the more a firm’s discussion of potential negative outcomes 
centers on firm fundamentals (e.g. earnings, cash flows, sales, etc.), the greater the 
likelihood of a potential impact to these fundamentals.   I view these measures as 
alternative proxies for the information content of a Risk Factor update, however each has 
advantages.  While the indicator variable is easy to interpret, unlike the key word 
measure, it is unable to capture differences in the size of a Risk Factor update.  For 
example, a firm with multiple updated or new risk factors may be more likely to 
experience future adverse outcomes than a firm with only one new risk factor.  However, 
longer disclosures may also be due to repetition of some previously disclosed information 
or variations in length due to managerial discretion, which may not be relevant.  Overall, 
neither measure can fully capture the probability of an adverse outcome occurring or the 
level of materiality of a possible adverse outcome.  Thus, it is not clear that one measure 
is necessarily better than the other.  Therefore, I include results using both measures 
throughout my analysis.   
                                                 
2
 The Python programming language is an open source language, which is free for public or commercial 
use.  It is comparable to other programming languages such as Perl, Ruby, and Java.  See 
http://www.python.org/about/ for additional information.  
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I compute the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) around the filing date of the 
10-Q as the primary dependent variable of interest to test my first hypothesis.  To 
examine whether the market reaction is greater for firms with a higher degree of 
information asymmetry, I include the level of information asymmetry and an interaction 
term between information asymmetry and firms that issue quarterly updates in my 
regression analysis.  I utilize two alternative measures of the degree of information 
asymmetry that have been used in the prior literature: the percentage of institutional 
ownership of the firm and the number of analysts following the firm.  To examine 
whether quarterly updates are associated with future adverse outcomes and the presence 
of extreme future negative earnings shocks, I utilize both analyst forecasts and a 
cross-sectional earnings prediction model as measures of expected earnings.  Because of 
the uncertainty inherent in Risk Factor disclosures, I utilize three different time periods to 
test for future performance shocks.  First, I examine performance shocks in the quarter 
following an update.  Second, I examine performance shocks for the first fiscal year end 
following a quarterly update.  Finally, I examine performance shocks for the second 
fiscal year end following a quarterly update.  After consideration of the data requirements 
discussed above, the sample used for testing my first two predictions consists of 7,212 
firm-quarters covering the period 2006-2009.  For tests related to subsequent negative 
performance, the sample is reduced, for reasons discussed in more detail below.   
 I find evidence consistent with Risk Factor updates in quarterly reports providing 
valuable information to investors.  I find a significantly negative association between the 
issuance of a quarterly Risk Factor update and CAR (-0.0043) (p-value=0.000).  I also 
find a significantly negative association (p-value=0.000) between market returns and the 
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number of key words in the Risk Factor disclosure.  However, I find very little evidence 
that the strength of the association is sensitive to the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and investors.  When I use the decile rank of the percentage of 
institutional ownership as a measure of information asymmetry, I find that the 
coefficients on the interaction of the Risk Factor update variables with information 
asymmetry are not statistically significant (p-value=0.226 or p-value=0.447).  When I use 
the number of analysts following the firm as a measure of information asymmetry, I find 
that the coefficients on the interaction of the Risk Factor update variables with 
information asymmetry are only significant at the 10 percent level (p-value=0.098 or 
p-value=0.108).  These results provide only weak support for my hypothesis that the 
information content of quarterly updates is significantly impacted by the level of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors.    
 I find that the variable indicating the presence of a Risk Factor update is 
associated with more negative unexpected earnings, and with higher propensities to 
experience extreme negative earnings shocks in the quarter following a Risk Factor 
update, as well at the first fiscal year end after a quarterly update.  However, the number 
of key words in a Risk Factor update is only statistically significant in tests examining the 
first fiscal year end after a quarterly update.  In addition, I find a positive association 
between each Risk Factor measure and next quarter losses, as well as the presence of next 
quarter negative special items reported on the income statement.  However, I find no 
evidence regarding an association between firms with Risk Factor updates and negative 
earnings shocks in the second fiscal year end following an update.  Taken together, these 
results suggest that quarterly updates to Risk Factors are associated with future negative 
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earnings shocks that appear to be realized within the first fiscal year-end period.  
However, I also find weak evidence regarding an association between quarterly Risk 
Factor Updates and future positive earnings shocks.  Overall, this evidence is consistent 
with firms providing quarterly updates to Risk Factors having greater downside and 
upside potential, leading to greater earnings volatility in future periods.  Combined with 
the significant negative market reaction to quarterly Risk Factor updates, downside risk 
appears to be effectively communicated at the time of the 10-Q filing.  However, because 
the Risk Factor updates in quarterly reports focus on adverse outcomes they do not reveal 
the increased probability of favorable outcomes.   
This study contributes to existing literature in three ways.  First, I provide 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of the SEC’s new disclosure requirement in 
quarterly reports, including whether Risk Factor update disclosures provide information 
about future negative outcomes.  The SEC has stated concerns that the information being 
presented in Risk Factor sections is “too broad and generic” and that the disclosures need 
to be “more-targeted” (Johnson 2010).  However, my evidence suggests that firms appear 
to use the disclosure of Risk Factor updates to provide information about potential future 
adverse events that the market appears to impound into stock price.  In addition, Risk 
Factor updates appear to be followed by the realization of potential negative outcomes.  
Therefore, this study is of direct interest to regulators who have expressed concern over 
the current Risk Factor disclosure requirements (Johnson 2010), by providing evidence 
that Risk Factor disclosures in quarterly reports appear to be achieving the SEC’s stated 
objective on average.  Second, this study provides evidence regarding whether findings 
from Initial Public Offering (IPO) literature on Risk Factor disclosure apply to 
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established firms with richer information environments and a different market structure.  
Even though the requirement to disclose Risk Factors in 10-K and 10-Q filings is 
relatively new, Risk Factors have long been required in prospectus statements.  
Researchers in this area conclude that Risk Factors contain valuable information (Beatty 
and Welch 1996; Hanley and Hoberg 2008; Balakrishnan and Bartov 2008).  However, 
there are key differences in the information environment as well as the market structure 
between these two settings.  Because firms engaging in an IPO have limited operating 
results, limited analyst following, limited disclosure in the public domain, and have an 
underwriter setting the initial price of the transaction, it is not clear that findings from the 
IPO literature will provide insights outside of that unique setting.  Third, prior research 
has struggled to find overall market reactions to the filings of quarterly reports.  Market 
reactions have generally only been documented when the 10-Q is the first release of 
earnings information, contains different earnings numbers relative to a prior earnings 
announcement, or is filed late (Hollie, Livnat, and Segal 2005; Li and Ramesh 2009).  I 
extend prior research on the information content of quarterly reports by exploring an 
additional context (when Risk Factors are updated) where quarterly reports may be 
informative to investors. 
 In the next chapter, I develop the hypotheses and discuss the related literature.  In 
Chapter III, I discuss the data and research design.  In Chapter IV, I present the results of 
the tests.  In Chapter V, I present sensitivity analyses.  In Chapter VI, I conclude. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background 
In 2005, the SEC issued Release Nos. 33-8591 and 34-52056 requiring registrants 
to disclose Risk Factors in quarterly and annual reports to provide the securities market 
with timely information about potential future outcomes that may adversely affect the 
company’s financial performance (SEC 2005).3  In their review of recent securities 
regulation, Robbins and Rothenberg (2006) explain that “Companies and their counsel 
who are drafting and revising risk factors must anticipate potential problems facing the 
company and describe them.”  This mandate is part of the SEC’s ongoing commitment to 
provide investors with useful information as the reporting environment evolves over time.  
While the disclosure of Risk Factors in prospectus statements associated with IPOs (see 
the next section for a review of this literature) has been present since the implementation 
of Regulation S-K, this was the first time it was applied to filings from publicly traded 
companies in the secondary market.   
 Disclosure theory suggests that managers tend to withhold bad news and disclose 
good news (Dye 2001).  Verrecchia (2001) notes that the incentive to withhold bad news 
may result from current rewards based on market capitalization (i.e. due to incomplete 
contracting) and/or due to the manager’s belief that he/she is being evaluated based on a 
market capitalization benchmark.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) model the relationship 
between potential termination of a CEO as well as the CEO’s future salary and optimal 
levels of disclosure and conclude that managers are likely to withhold bad news.  
                                                 
3
 The SEC does not have a specific threshold for disclosure in terms of probability of occurrence or amount 
of impact to performance other than requiring only the disclosure of “material” risk factors. 
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Empirical evidence is also consistent with this theory.  Kothari et al. (2009) provide 
evidence that the average market reaction is stronger for bad news than for good news, 
which is consistent with firms withholding price-decreasing information and accelerating 
the release of price-increasing information.  Kothari et al. (2009) note that this behavior is 
consistent with managers being concerned about the stock price reaction to negative 
information and gambling that the potential negative outcome is never realized.  Green et 
al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion by using a proprietary dataset that analyzes news 
events to generate a continuous measure capturing the degree of bad news or good news 
in the news event.  Green et al. (2011) find that firm-generated press releases are more 
likely to reflect good news events than bad news events.  Graham et al.’s (2005) survey 
of executives indicates that executives withhold bad news in hopes that the firm’s 
position will improve. 
 The incentive to withhold bad news is offset by potential legal penalties or SEC 
sanctions for failing to disclose negative information.  Skinner (1994; 1997) and Baginski 
et al. (2002) find that litigation risk motivates managers to accelerate the disclosure of 
bad news.  Graham et al. (2005) find that executives’ fear of litigation motivates the 
disclosure of bad news even if the potential for a negative judgment is low.  Nelson and 
Pritchard (2007) find that managers increase their use of cautionary language as litigation 
risk increases.  The evidence from these studies suggests that an increase in litigation risk 
should increase the perceived cost of nondisclosure to managers.  In addition, during my 
sample period, mangers’ perceived litigation risk may be more pronounced due to the 
high regulatory focus on undertaking significant risk identification practices (SOX 2002; 
NYSE 2003).  Thus, in determining whether to comply with disclosure requirements, I 
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assume that managers assess the expected cost of an enforcement action and weigh that 
against the perceived costs of disclosure.  In addition, ex ante levels of litigation risk may 
affect a firm’s disclosure choices in this setting.   However, simple measures of ex ante 
litigation risk generally do a poor job of differentiating between actual levels of ex ante 
litigation risk (Kim and Skinner 2010).  Thus, in this study I implicitly assume that ex 
ante litigation risk is constant across my sample, which may reduce the power of my 
tests.       
 Overall, the increase in the potential costs of withholding valuable information as 
a result of the mandate is likely to further incentivize managers to provide additional 
information regarding an increase in the probability of material adverse events in their 
Risk Factors disclosures.  However, the extent to which this occurs remains an empirical 
question.  
The Disclosure of “Risk Factors” in Prospectuses 
Even though Risk Factor disclosures were only recently required in quarterly and 
annual reports (effective December 1, 2005), they have long been a part of prospectus 
statements and the filings of certain foreign private issuers (Form 20-F).  In studying 
IPOs, prior research finds that longer Risk Factor disclosures in prospectus statements are 
related to IPO underpricing (Beatty and Welch 1996; Arnold, Fishe, and North 2007; 
Deumes 2008, Hanley and Hoberg 2008).  These results are consistent with longer Risk 
Factor sections reflecting greater uncertainty, which leads underwriters to lower the 
prices of the IPOs.  Specifically, Hanley and Hoberg (2008) find a negative association 
between the relative size of the Risk Factors section and the level of initial underpricing.  
Arnold et al. (2007) use both counts of the number of Risk Factors and the length of the 
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Risk Factors section and find that the Risk Factors section disclosed in prospectus 
statements is related to both initial underpricing and long-term returns.  The latter result 
could indicate that some risk factors are not being disclosed, or that investors do not 
correctly price disclosed risk factors.  Overall, the authors conclude that the Risk Factors 
section in prospectus statements is meaningful, but could be incomplete.   
Abdou and Dicle (2007) focus on IPO underpricing in the context of retail and 
high-tech industries during the internet bubble of the late 20th century and find that some, 
but not all, risk factors appear to be priced.  This finding supports the idea that some 
information may be boilerplate while other information may have direct security price 
implications.  
Finally, Balakrishnan and Bartov (2008) use Risk Factor disclosures in IPO 
prospectus statements to predict future earnings and future stock returns, and to study 
whether analysts incorporate this information into their forecasts.   The authors develop a 
list of 37 words that capture the economic fundamentals of the firm and use the number 
of these words appearing in the Risk Factors section as their primary variable of interest.  
The authors find that the information in the Risk Factors section in prospectuses is 
negatively correlated with future earnings and analysts’ forecasts of future earnings.  
However, the authors also find a negative correlation between Risk Factor disclosures 
and analyst forecast error, concluding that analysts may provide overly optimistic 
forecasts after the disclosure of the risk factors.  Overall, these results suggest that Risk 
Factor disclosures in prospectus statements contain information about future earnings that 
may only be partially incorporated by analysts.   
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 Overall, the evidence indicates that Risk Factor disclosures in prospectus 
documents are informative about future firm performance.  Risk Factor disclosures in 
IPOs appear to contain information that is impounded into prices, and are associated with 
lower future earnings performance.  However, it is not clear whether those results would 
apply to the SEC requirement that firms disclose Risk Factors in filings for publicly 
traded firms.  Balakrishnan and Bartov (2008) motivate their study of prospectus 
statements by noting that the SEC pays closer attention to the language in the offering 
prospectus, as opposed to the language in 10-Q and 10-K filings and that therefore the 
expected costs of non-compliance are greater for prospectus disclosures.  In addition, the 
prospectus disclosures apply to smaller reporting companies (who are generally younger 
and have a lower number of analysts following the firm) that are exempt from the new 
disclosure requirement in 10-Qs and 10-Ks.  In addition to differences in the information 
environment, the structure of the market that determines the pricing of IPOs differs from 
the market that determines the price of securities traded in the secondary market.  
Because the underwriter in an IPO sets the price and bears the risk of overpricing the 
IPO, pricing effects may be more likely to occur in an IPO setting.  Clearly, the 
differences in these two settings highlight the fact that it is not clear that the SEC’s 
mandate will provide useful information to investors for firms that have historically been 
traded on public exchanges. 
The Disclosure of “Risk Factors” in 10-Ks 
 As discussed above, there are two concurrent working papers that investigate Risk 
Factor disclosures in annual reports.  Huang (2010) develops a computer algorithm to 
identify Risk Factor headings and then uses key word analysis to determine whether one 
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of his target 25 risk factors are identified in the 10-K.  This technique is more advanced 
than the Python routine used in my analysis, which extracts the entire Risk Factors 
section, but is unable to separately identify headings.  Huang (2010) provides mixed 
evidence regarding whether the 25 risk factors he identifies are associated with future 
measures of risk and firm performance. 
 Campbell et al. (2011) find that the length of Risk factor sections in annual 
reports is negatively related to short window abnormal returns around the filing of the 
10-K, and attribute this price reaction to changes in the discount factor used by investors.  
However, Campbell et al. (2011, Table 9) find that their measures of systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk contained in Risk Factor disclosures both appear to be priced.4  This 
evidence could indicate that there is measurement error in their classification of non-
systematic risk, that idiosyncratic risk is priced, or that the disclosure leads to a decrease 
in future expectations of cash flows as well as increases in general uncertainty.  
 Overall, concurrent work provides evidence that Risk Factor disclosures in annual 
reports have informational value.  However, the literature does not address whether Risk 
Factor disclosures are associated with future negative shocks to performance.  In 
addition, the literature raises questions regarding whether the required Risk Factor 
disclosures in quarterly reports provide incremental information to annual disclosures.  It 
is not clear that results related to annual disclosures are generalizable to disclosures in 
quarterly reports.  While annual reports require a section describing all risk factors 
currently facing the firm, quarterly reports are only required to disclose material updates 
                                                 
4
 While Risk Factor disclosures may in fact provide some systematic risk information, this was clearly not 
the SEC’s intent.  Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K states “Do not present risks that could apply to any issuer 
or any offering.” See 17 CFR 229.503(c) available at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov, which describes the 
original instructions for filing a prospectus statement under the Securities Act of 1933.     
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and therefore may exclude the Risk Factors section altogether.  This difference in 
disclosure requirements may alter manager’s perception of the costs of disclosure in this 
setting.  In addition, quarterly reports are reviewed (rather than audited), and must be 
filed in a shorter window of time relative to annual reports, potentially providing 
increased discretion to managers in this scenario.         
Information Content of Quarterly Reports 
 Research on the information content of quarterly reports investigates whether 
there is broad informational value in quarterly reports.  The tension in this issue stems 
from the fact that 10-Qs are commonly preempted by earnings releases.  Studies before 
the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
system found limited evidence of market reactions to 10-Qs.  Easton and Zmijewski 
(1993) find market reactions around 10-Q filings when they are likely to be the first 
release of earnings information; however, they find no market reaction when 10-Qs are 
preempted by a general earnings announcement.  Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002) 
find that in limited circumstances where earnings have likely been managed, unexpected 
discretionary accruals conveyed in quarterly reports generate a price reaction.  Griffin 
(2003) provides evidence that there is a general market reaction to 10-Q filings in a more 
recent time period.  However, Li and Ramesh (2009) show that Griffin’s (2003) results 
do not account for the sequence of public earnings releases.  In other words, consistent 
with early work by Easton and Zmijewski (1993), Li and Ramesh (2009) show that a 
statistically significant market reaction to the filing of a 10-Q only exists when the 10-Q 
is likely the first release of quarterly earnings information (i.e. where there was no 
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preceding press release).  Overall, the evidence surrounding market reactions to the filing 
of quarterly reports is context specific.   
Hypotheses 
 This study specifically focuses on the information content of quarterly updates to 
Risk Factors.  While annual reports present a complete summary of existing Risk Factors 
facing the firm, quarterly reports are required to provide any updates to those Risk 
Factors (including the addition of new Risk Factors) that may have been identified during 
the quarter.  Asset pricing theory asserts that security prices are determined by expected 
future cash flows discounted to the present value (Cochrane, 2005).  Therefore, updates 
to Risk Factors in quarterly reports should only affect the value of the underlying stock if 
they either provide information that changes the timing or amount of expected future cash 
flows of the firm, or the discount factor that investors apply to those cash flows.  
According to the mandate, updates to Risk Factors should provide information about 
uncertain future negative outcomes facing the firm.  See Appendix A for an example of a 
Risk Factor update in a quarterly report.  Quarterly updates could conceivably provide 
good news (i.e. a reduction in the probability of a negative event).  However, in this study 
I assume that managers use the 10-Q to disclose bad news, e.g., an increase in the 
probability of a negative event.  Consistent with this assumption, in a random sample of 
200 firm-quarters (of which 81 contained an update to their Risk Factor disclosure) I 
found that only two observations contained a deletion of a risk factor.  In addition, both 
of those observations also contained additional “bad news” risk factors, further mitigating 
the effect of potential good news.5 
                                                 
5
 In addition, consistent with Kothari et al. (2009) and Green et al. (2011), managers will likely disclose 
good news at their earliest possible convenience.  Therefore, these “good news” events that may be in the 
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Based on the analysis above, as the possibility of negative future outcomes 
increases, ceteris paribus, the expected value of future cash flows should decrease.  
Therefore, I expect Risk Factor updates in quarterly reports to provide information about 
increased probabilities of negative future outcomes and predict that they will be 
negatively related to returns.  
Therefore, my first hypothesis is as follows (stated in alternative form): 
H1: Abnormal returns around the time of the 10-Q filing are lower for firms with 
Risk Factor updates relative to firms without Risk Factor updates. 
 A necessary condition for the market reaction predicted in H1 is that the 
information disclosed in the Risk Factors section of the 10-Q represents new information 
that had not previously been impounded in price.  Thus, the extent of the market reaction 
to the disclosure of risk factors should depend on the information environment 
surrounding the firm, i.e., the likelihood that the information has already been priced.  
Firms with greater symmetry of information should experience a smaller reaction to Risk 
Factor updates in 10-Q reports because their information is more likely to have already 
been communicated to investors via some other means (e.g. other management 
disclosures or private information acquisition).  As a result, I expect the effect 
documented in H1 to be attenuated in settings where information asymmetry is lower.  
Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows (stated in alternative form): 
H2: The market reaction to Risk Factor updates in 10-Q filings is attenuated as 
the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors decreases.   
                                                                                                                                                 
sample are likely “no news” events at the time of mandatory disclosure due to preemptive disclosure.  This 
further mitigates the impact of these events in my sample which could potentially weaken my results. 
 20 
 
 
 Studies examining Risk Factors in annual reports and prospectus statements 
suggest that Risk Factor disclosures (at least in those contexts) may provide information 
about general uncertainty that might impact the discount factor used by investors (Arnold 
et al. 2007; Deumes 2008; Campbell et al. 2011).  As a result, the aforementioned studies 
focus on general measures of risk, such as Beta and firm-specific return volatility.  In 
contrast, because the Risk Factor update disclosures focus specifically on the probability 
of adverse outcomes, i.e., downside risk, I expect the stock price reactions to quarterly 
updates to be primarily driven by changes to estimates of future cash flows.  This 
explanation would be consistent with the SEC’s contention that the Risk Factors 
disclosed should provide investors with information about potential negative outcomes 
(SEC 2004; Robbins and Rothenburg 2006) and with studies in the IPO literature that 
find that Risk Factor disclosures in prospectuses are associated with future negative 
performance (Balakrishnan and Bartov 2008).   
If Risk Factor disclosures provide investors with information about potential 
future negative outcomes, then I expect that firms with Risk Factor updates should be 
more likely to experience adverse outcomes in future periods.6  However, because the 
eventual timing of the resolution of these risks is uncertain, it is unclear as to when 
realizations of existing risk factors may take place.  I expect that, due to conservatism 
inherent in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), earnings (over cash 
                                                 
6
 For example, in the second quarter of 2009 Capella Education Company disclosed that the IRS was 
currently conducting a payroll tax audit.  As part of the audit, the IRS was apparently questioning the 
current classification of adjunct faculty as independent contractors rather than employees.  Capella 
disclosed that this matter was not currently resolved, and that they were working with the IRS to determine 
the correct classification of their workers.  However, if it was ruled that the adjunct faculty were 
employees, this would clearly negatively affect their profitability as they would be assessed payroll taxes 
on a significant percentage of their workforce (possibly retroactively). See 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1104349/000119312509156372/d10q.htm for a copy of the 10-Q 
filing.    
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flows) will more quickly reflect any state realizations of negative outcomes.  Therefore, 
my third hypothesis is as follows (stated in alternative form): 
H3A: Firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience future adverse 
outcomes relative to firms without Risk Factor updates. 
 Following this hypothesis, if Risk Factor updates provide information about 
material uncertain negative outcomes, then I expect firms presenting updates to their Risk 
Factor disclosures are more likely to experience future extreme negative earnings shocks 
relative to other deviations from expected earnings.  In other words, within the 
distribution of earnings shocks, I expect firms presenting Risk Factor updates to have a 
higher propensity to end up in the extreme negative side of the distribution relative to 
firms without Risk Factor updates.  Therefore, my fourth hypothesis is as follows (stated 
in alternative form): 
H3B: Firms with Risk Factor updates have a higher propensity for extreme 
negative earnings shocks relative to firms without Risk Factor updates.  
Because of the uncertainty related to the realization of a negative outcome, I 
utilize various quarterly and annual intervals to test for an association between Risk 
Factor updates and earnings shocks.  This in turn allows H3 to provide insight into the 
imminence of risk factors disclosed in quarterly reports. 
The hypotheses presented above relate to the probability of negative events 
occurring, due to the nature of the disclosures.  However, concurrent research suggests 
that Risk Factor disclosures in annual reports contain information about volatility in 
general (Campbell et al. 2011).  In other words, even though the disclosure itself does not 
provide specific information regarding the likelihood of good events occurring, Risk 
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Factor updates may proxy for both upside and downside potential.  Therefore, when 
examining H3, I include tests related to positive earnings shocks as well as negative 
earnings shocks.    
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CHAPTER III 
REASEARCH DESIGN 
Measuring Risk Factor Updates 
I utilize the Python programming language to gather SEC filings (including the 
date filed with the SEC), to extract the “Item 1A. Risk Factors” section, and to 
summarize information contained in the extracted section.  The requirement to include 
risk factors in annual reports is effective for fiscal years ending after December 1, 2005 
(SEC 2005).  However, quarterly updates were not required until after a firm had filed 
their first Risk Factors section in an annual report.  Therefore, firms began disclosing 
quarterly updates for quarters with fiscal year ends after December 1, 2006.  Small 
business filers (firms with public float of $25 Million or less) were initially excluded 
from this requirement (SEC 2005).  As of February 4, 2008, all “Smaller Reporting 
Companies” were officially excluded from this reporting requirement as well (firms with 
a public float of $75 Million or less) (SEC 2007).   
Public float is defined by the SEC as the market value of common equity held by 
nonaffilitates of the issuer (Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman 2009).  Historical public float 
values are not available on a computerized database, but should (by definition) always be 
lower than total market value of common equity (Chan, Farrell, and Lee 2008).  Nondorf, 
Singer, and You (2011) find that firms opportunistically manage down their public float 
temporarily to maintain classification as a Smaller Reporting Company, which may 
exacerbate the difference between public float and total market value of equity for firms 
close to the cutoff.  Therefore, to exclude Smaller Reporting Companies from my sample 
I use a conservative benchmark of market values as of the end of the quarter of less than 
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$100 million to focus on firms that were subject to the reporting requirement.  Thus, my 
initial sample collection includes 10-Q filings from 2006-2009 for firms with a market 
value of at least $100 million that are available in the EDGAR database. 
The data gathering process starts by using the Python programming language to 
open all 10-Qs filed during the sample period, extract the Risk Factors section, and count 
the number of words in that section.  Since the SEC requires that Risk Factors be 
disclosed under the heading “Item 1A. Risk Factors”, this standardization aids my ability 
to extract these sections consistently.7  Additionally, the Python algorithm counts each 
occurrence of the number of words occurring in the Risk Factor disclosure from the set of 
words defined in Balakrishnan and Bartov (2008).  This generates a cumulative total of 
the number of times any of these words is mentioned in the Risk Factor section.8  This 
word set was developed to capture words relating to the economic fundamentals of the 
firm.  The word set is: {bankrupt, bankruptcy, business, cash, charge, competition, 
competitive, competitor, conditions, cost, customer, cyclical, demand, division, earnings, 
economy, environment, expense, financial, income, lawsuit, legal, liquidity, litigation, 
market, operations, product, production, profit, revenue, sales, seasonal, services, 
settlement, solvency, spending, sue} (Balakrishnan and Bartov 2008).   
I make two initial assumptions when classifying firms as having an update to their 
Risk Factors disclosure.  First, because many firms without an update may simply omit 
this section from their 10-Q, I assume that if a 10-Q exists and my Python algorithm is 
                                                 
7
 There is some variation in the format used to title this section.  I accommodate reasonable variations in 
spacing, use of a colon instead a period, as well as bolding and/or underlining to minimize the chance of 
either collecting the wrong section or erroneously concluding that the section does not exist.  
 
8
 Python creates a cumulative count any time one of these words appears in the text, including when the 
word appears as part of another word.  For example, “charge” and “charged” would be counted, but 
“charging” would not. 
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unable to capture this section that there has been no update to the risk factors that were 
disclosed in the prior annual report.  Second, to be classified as having an update I require 
the section extracted to have a word count larger than 150 words.  This requirement is 
necessary because many firms include this section, but provide a brief discussion of the 
reporting requirement, ultimately stating that there have been no material changes to their 
Risk Factors disclosure since the annual report.9   
 Following the discussion above, I create an indicator variable, UPDATERit, that is 
set equal to 1 for firm-quarters in which an update to the firm’s Risk Factors section is 
identified, and 0 otherwise; and a continuous variable, BB_WORDSit, that is equal to the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of words as defined using the list in 
Balakrishnan and Bartov (2008) that was presented above.  This variable is Winsorized at 
1% and 99% to reduce the influence of outliers.   
 I also collect the Risk Factor disclosure from annual reports for fiscal years 
ending after December 1, 2005 for two reasons.  First, this serves as an additional control 
to ensure that firms in my sample meet the requirements for disclosing Risk Factors.  I 
therefore exclude all observations where I am unable to locate a disclosure in the prior 
10-K.  I also exclude observations where the disclosure in the 10-K is listed as containing 
less than 200 words, since an abnormally small section may indicate some form of data 
error.10  The second reason I gather this information is that some quarterly disclosures are 
quite long and thus may be repetitions of the annual disclosure, despite the SEC 
                                                 
9
 The 150-word cutoff was selected based on a review of extractions containing small sections.  However, 
using a rigid cutoff may result in some potential misclassifications.  In untabulated tests I exclude all 
observations with word counts between 100 and 200 words to avoid potential misclassifications and find 
similar results.  This alternative methodology results in 704 fewer firm-quarters being included in the 
analysis. 
 
10
 There were only 20 observations excluded due to the 10-K Risk Factor section containing less than 200 
words.   
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specifically discouraging this type of behavior.  To provide some insight on this issue, I 
calculated the number of words in the 10-Q update relative to the 10-K disclosure.  I then 
generated a random sample of 200 quarterly disclosures that fall within the range of 95% 
to 105% of the annual disclosure.  There are 578 observations that fall into this category 
(making up 32 percent of the total number of firms classified as having a quarterly 
update).  For the random sample of 200, I opened each of these disclosures and manually 
read the opening paragraph(s) before the listing of risk factors begins (if such a paragraph 
exists).  I find that 21.5% of these disclosures either state there has been some form of 
update, or that the disclosure specifically supersedes the annual disclosure.  I find that 
only 7% of the observations specifically state that there have been no updates.  The 
remaining 71.5% percent of the disclosures either do not provide an introductory 
paragraph, or do not state whether an update is being presented.  Based on this analysis I 
include all of these firms in my sample as updates for three reasons.  First, the SEC 
specifically states that the rules surrounding quarterly reports “do not otherwise require, 
and we discourage, unnecessary restatement or repetition of risk factors in quarterly 
reports” (SEC 2005).  Therefore, for firms to comply with the regulation, updates 
presented in the 10-Q should not be wholesale repetitions.  Second, these longer 
disclosures may actually be the most meaningful updates being presented either due to 
their sheer size, or because there may be an attempt by managers to bury a new risk factor 
amongst other previously disclosed information.11  Finally, of the firms in the random 
                                                 
11
 Because the SEC specifically states that firms should not re-present their annual disclosures in quarterly 
reports, managers may be committing a simple error by including previously disclosed risk factors in their 
quarterly reports.  If this is true, I expect to observe this phenomenon to be stronger at the beginning of the 
sample period.  However, inconsistent with this interpretation, I find that the percentage of all firms 
classified as updaters that are within 95% and 105% of the most recent annual disclosure remains relatively 
constant throughout each year in my sample. 
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sample of 200 firms where the existence of an update can be easily identified, 
approximately three times as many state that there has been a change in the quarterly 
disclosure as opposed to stating there has been no change. 
 Clearly, this assumption may have consequences.  To the extent that firms with no 
real updates are classified as having updates, my results should weaken.  However, it is 
also possible that these firms could be driving the results even if there are no updates 
being presented on average due to some omitted factor that is correlated with a firm’s 
failure to comply exactly with the SEC regulation.  Thus, these firms could bias my 
results.  Therefore, in Chapter V, I address these concerns by excluding all observations 
that are greater than 95 percent of their most recent annual disclosure and find consistent 
results.  See Chapter V for more detail.       
Measuring Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Griffin (2003) documents that the response to a 10-Q filing on EDGAR normally 
occurs over the three-day window of 0 to +2.  Therefore, I define CARfit as the 
cumulative abnormal return for firm i around the filing of their 10-Q in quarter t using the 
0 to +2 window.  More specifically: 
 
Where d = 0 is the date the 10-Q is filed with the SEC and d=2 is the second trading date 
following the filing date.  RETid is the return for firm i on day d.  RETmd is the return for 
the CRSP value-weighted market index on day d.  The filing date is obtained from 
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EDGAR using the Python programming language.12  CARf is Winsorized at 1% and 99% 
to reduce the influence of outliers. 
Proxies for Information Asymmetry 
 El-Gazzar (1998) finds that higher levels of institutional holdings are associated 
with lower market reactions around earnings announcements and offers two explanations 
for these findings.  First, El-Gazzar (1998) explains that institutional investors have 
additional incentives and resources to search for private information.  Second, 
institutional investors may be able to influence the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
firm (El-Gazzar 1998).   This is consistent with institutions being more likely to utilize 
and incorporate the most accurate publically available information because institutional 
investors may have superior information processing capabilities (Hand 1990; Walther 
1997; Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 2000).  Overall, prior literature suggests that 
the level of institutional ownership of a firm should be highly correlated with the level of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors.  Thus, prior literature focusing 
on the information content of 10-Q filings has used the level of institutional ownership to 
proxy for differences in information environments (Balsam et al. 2002; Griffin 2003).  
Balsam et al. (2002) utilize the percentage of institutional ownership as a proxy for how 
informed investors are when the authors analyze the effect of accruals on CAR in a 
specific setting where earnings were likely to be managed.  They find that the marginal 
impact on stock price of news consistent with earnings management behavior is increased 
                                                 
12
 The results presented in Chapter IV are similar for a variety of alternative methodologies.  Specifically, 
similar results are obtained when using a buy-and-hold abnormal return over the three-day window, using 
the window -1 to +1, and using the market model to generate expected returns.  The market model utilizes a 
60 day estimation window from day -90 through -31, relative to the SEC filing date for the 10-Q.  The 
following regression is estimated by firm: RETit=β0+β1RETmt+εit, where RETmt is the value-weighted 
market return.  Abnormal return is then defined as the actual return for firm i minus the predicted return 
using the coefficients from the regression.  
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when information asymmetry is low (i.e. institutional ownership is high).  Griffin (2003) 
finds that the absolute value of the market reaction to quarterly filings is greater for firms 
with lower levels of institutional ownership, consistent with institutional ownership 
capturing the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors.   
Following this line of research I utilize the percentage of institutional ownership 
to proxy for the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors.  
Because it is not clear that slight changes in institutional ownership are associated with 
movements in information asymmetry, past studies have utilized an indicator variable to 
capture high levels of information asymmetry (Balsam et al. 2002; Griffin 2003).  In 
keeping with this intuition, I measure information asymmetry as the decile rank of 
institutional ownership.  More specifically, the percentage of institutional ownership is 
calculated using data from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database, 
and is defined as the sum of institutional shares held at the end of the quarter divided by 
the shares outstanding.  INSTPERCit is defined as the decile rank of the percentage of 
institutional ownership.13 
 As an additional proxy for the level of information asymmetry between managers 
and investors, I utilize the number of analysts following the firm.  Prior research has 
found that analysts primarily interpret existing information, as opposed to conveying new 
information, and analyst following increases with disclosure quality (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996).  Therefore, prior work has utilized the number of analysts following a 
firm as a measure of the quality of the information environment (Lang, Maffett, and 
Owens 2010; De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi forthcoming; among others).  Specifically, I 
                                                 
13
 Using an indicator variable equal to 1 if institutional ownership is above the median, and zero otherwise 
produces similar results.  In addition, using the raw percentage of institutional ownership also produces 
similar results. 
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define NUMESTit as the natural logarithm of the number of earnings-per-share estimates 
used in generating the mean analyst forecast closest to the earnings announcement date 
from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES).  
Tests of H1 and H2 
 To test H1, I run the following regression: 
CARfit = β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4NEWSit + β5CAReait + εit  (1) 
CARfit was defined above.  QRFIit (quarterly Risk Factor information) is either 
UPDATERit or BB_WORDSit, as defined above.  For reference, I include Compustat 
Xpressfeed Data item names in parentheses when defining the following variables.  
LMVEit is the natural log of the market value of equity for firm i for quarter t 
(ln(prccq*cshoq)).  Prior research has shown that the size of the firm helps to explain the 
cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns around quarterly filings (Balsam et al. 2002; 
Griffin 2003).  BTMit is a proxy for growth and is included to control for additional 
sensitivity to common risk factors in stock returns that have been shown in prior literature 
to explain the cross sectional variation in abnormal returns (ceqq/(prccq*cshoq)).  
NEWSit is the earnings announcement news for the quarter, calculated as actual earnings 
for the quarter as reported by IBES minus the mean analyst forecast closest to (but not 
after) the earnings announcement date.  To calculate NEWSit I use the unadjusted files in 
IBES and adjust for stock splits with the approach suggested by Robinson and Glushkov 
(2006), which utilizes the CRSP cumulative adjustment factors from the CRSP daily file.  
Information in the quarterly report should confirm information released in the initial 
earnings announcement.  The release of confirming information may be related to 
abnormal returns around the filing date.  In addition, other information released at the 
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time of the initial earnings announcement may be correlated with returns around the 
filing of the 10-Q.  To control for other potential factors affecting the firm that may be 
disclosed prior to the Risk Factor updates being disclosed, I include the three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date.  CAReait is defined 
in the same way as CARfit described above, with the exception that I use the three-day 
window spanning one day prior to the earnings announcement date to one day after the 
earnings announcement date to capture potential information leakage.  LMVEit, BTMit, 
NEWSit, and CAReait are Winsorized at 1% and 99% to reduce the influence of outliers.  
H1 predicts a negative association between QRFI and CARf (β1 < 0).   
 To test H2 I estimate the following equation that modifies equation (1): 
CARfit = β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4NEWSit + β5CAReait  
+ β6INFOASYMit + β7INFOASYM*QRFIit + εit                    (2) 
INFOASYMit either takes the value of INSTPERCit or NUMESTit, which along with all 
other variables were defined above.  H2 predicts that the effect of QRFI is attenuated as 
the level of information asymmetry decreases (as INSTPERC and NUMEST increase).  
Therefore, assuming β1<0, H2 predicts a positive association of INFOASYM and QRFI 
(β6>0). 
Tests of H3 
 H3A predicts that firms with Risk Factor updates in quarterly reports are more 
likely to experience future negative outcomes.  H3B predicts that firms with Risk Factor 
updates in quarterly reports have a higher propensity to experience future extreme 
negative earnings shocks.  Because it is unclear when potential negative shocks to 
earnings may materialize, I utilize three different intervals to test H3A and H3B: the 
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quarter immediately following a Risk Factor update, the first fiscal year end following a 
Risk Factor update, and the second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update.  The 
use of annual data in these tests is helpful for two reasons.  First, it allows me to use a 
robust cross-sectional model to make ex ante predictions of future earnings in addition to 
the use of analyst generated forecasts.  Second, the use of annual data allows for the 
possibility that the potential material shock may occur multiple quarters ahead, because it 
is not clear ex ante if a negative earnings shock will occur in the quarter immediately 
following an update.  However, two limitations of the use of annual data are that the 
sample size is significantly reduced, and it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the 
negative shock occurs within the year.  Consistent with the measurement of the variable 
NEWSit above, I consider unexpected earnings to be the earnings shock for the period.  
When utilizing analyst forecasts as the measure of expected earnings, I use the unadjusted 
files in IBES and adjust for stock splits with the approach suggested by Robinson and 
Glushkov (2006), which utilizes the CRSP cumulative adjustment factors from the CRSP 
daily file. 
Tests of H3 Using Data on a Quarterly Basis 
 Quarter t is the quarter in which a Risk Factor update may or may not be included 
in the 10-Q.  The earnings announcement and 10-Q for quarter t are released during 
quarter t+1.  Therefore, I utilize analysts’ forecasts measured at the beginning of quarter 
t+1 as a benchmark for investors’ expectations of earnings for quarter t+1.  See Figure 1 
in Appendix B for a visual depiction of the timeline.  This forecast reflects analysts’ 
expectations for quarter t+1 earnings after the earnings announcement for quarter t, but 
prior to the release of the 10-Q (and thus the current period Risk Factors Section) for 
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quarter t.  This provides a measure of earnings expectations for quarter t+1 that includes 
all information from current and previous quarters (including earnings for quarter t) 
excluding information from the 10-Q for quarter t.  To test H3A, which predicts that 
firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience negative outcomes in the 
quarter following a Risk Factor update, I estimate the following regression: 
QFCSTERRit+1 = β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4STDROEit  
+ β5CHGEARNit + β6PRIORQLOSSit + β7NUMESTit  
+ β8PRICEit + εit        (3) 
QRFIit was defined above.  QFCSTERRit+1 is the forecast error for quarter t+1 using the 
first consensus forecast for the period subsequent to the current period earnings 
announcement.  H3A predicts a negative relation between QRFIit and QFCSTERRit+1 
(β1<0).  In other words, due to the realization of negative outcomes, unexpected earnings 
are expected to be negatively related to the issuance of a Risk Factor update.   
In addition, I control for various factors that may influence analyst forecast error.    
The size of the firm, LMVEit (defined above), is included to control for potential 
differences in the voluntary disclosure environment across firms.  BTMit (defined above) 
is included because varying levels of growth opportunities may affect analysts’ forecasts 
of earnings as well as the disclosure environment among these firms.   STDROEit is 
calculated as the standard deviation of return on equity measured over the five prior fiscal 
year ends.   STDROEit is included because variability in prior performance may indicate 
that earnings are more difficult to forecast.  CHGEARNit is calculated as the seasonal 
change in earnings (current quarter earnings less earnings from the same quarter in the 
prior fiscal year, scaled by earnings from the same quarter in the prior fiscal year).  
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CHGEARNit is included because fluctuations in seasonal earnings may make forecasting 
earnings more difficult.   PRIORQLOSSit is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
experienced a loss in the same quarter in the prior fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  
PRIORQLOSSit is included to control for difficulty in the forecasting environment as well 
as differing incentives for managers of firms experiencing losses.  NUMESTit is included 
because the number of analysts following the firm proxies for the information 
environment of the firm, and therefore should be correlated with the accuracy of the 
average forecast.  NUMESTit is measured as the number of analysts following the firm at 
the time the average earnings per share estimate is formed.  Finally, PRICEit is the stock 
price measured at the beginning of the fiscal year and is included to control for variations 
in forecast error due to scale.  Many studies examining analyst forecast error intuitively 
scale forecast error by stock price to facilitate comparisons across firms.  The intuition 
behind this method is that since forecast error is measured per share, shares trading at 
higher prices may be associated with higher forecast error.  Two notable exceptions in the 
literature are Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) and Cheong and Thomas (2011) 
who argue that scaling by price may introduce bias in coefficient estimates.  Specifically, 
Cheong and Thomas (2011) show that analyst forecast error does not vary with scale.  
They attribute this surprising lack of variation to earnings smoothing activity by 
managers.  Therefore, I do not scale analyst forecast error by price anywhere in my 
analysis.  However, I include price as an explanatory variable to control for this potential 
effect, if it exists in my particular sample.14  STDROEit, CHGEARNit, and PRICEit are 
Winsorized at 1% and 99% to reduce the influence of outliers.   
                                                 
14
 Scaling forecast error by stock price throughout the analysis rather than including stock price as a control 
variable produces somewhat weaker results related to H3.  Specifically, results using quarterly data become 
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 H3B predicts that firms with Risk Factor updates in quarterly reports are more 
likely to experience extreme negative earnings shocks, consistent with the realization of 
material negative outcomes.  To test H3B, I estimate the following logit model: 
P(QEXTREMEit+1) = f(β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4STDROEit  
+ β5CHGEARNit + β6PRIORQLOSSit + β7NUMESTit  
+ β8PRICEit + εit)       (4) 
QEXTREMEit+1 is either QFCSTERR_10it+1 or QFCSTERR_90it+1.  QFCSTERR_10 it+1 is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if forecast error falls in the bottom 10 percent of the 
distribution of QFCSTERR
 it+1, and zero otherwise.  H3B predicts a positive relation 
between QFCSTERR_10
 it+1 and QRFI (β1>0).  In other words, I expect firms with Risk 
Factor updates in quarterly reports to have a higher propensity to experience extreme 
negative earnings shocks.  QFCSTERR_90
 it+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
forecast error falls in the top 10 percent of the distribution of QFCSTERR
 it+1, and zero 
otherwise.  H3B does not generate a prediction for the coefficient on QFCSTERR_90
 it+1; 
however, a positive coefficient on QRFI
 it would be consistent with firms with Risk 
Factor updates in quarterly reports having a higher propensity to experience extreme 
positive earnings shocks.  All other variables were defined above.  Because it is not clear 
from the SEC regulation what level of earnings shock should be considered extreme, I 
utilize an empirically generated cutoff of the bottom ten percent of the sample 
distribution.  However, results are generally consistent defining extreme observations as 
the top and bottom quartiles of the distribution.    
  
                                                                                                                                                 
generally insignificant.  In addition, the overall results generally become more strongly in favor of firms 
with quarterly updates to their Risk Factors section experiencing both negative and positive shocks to 
performance, which is consistent with the inferences presented in this paper.     
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Tests of H3 Using Data on an Annual Basis 
 As discussed above, because it is not clear when potential negative outcomes 
disclosed in a Risk Factor update might be realized, I utilize annual data to capture the 
realization of negative outcomes in future quarters.  To facilitate tests based on annual 
data, I require that each firm have only one observation per year.  This is important in 
order to avoid simultaneously classifying a firm as having a quarterly update and not 
having a quarterly update.  Data restrictions (discussed in more detail in Chapter IV) limit 
my analysis of UPDATER=1 to only the first quarterly update for a firm in a given year.  
Thus, there already exists a maximum of one “quarterly update” observation per firm-
year.  Therefore, for firm-years with an update, I keep that observation.  For all other 
firm-years I limit the data set to just one “non-update” observation per firm-year.   
 I use two different methods to estimate investors’ expectations of annual earnings 
to test H3A and H3B.  The first method utilizes the cross-sectional model presented in 
Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2010) to generate a benchmark for investors’ expectations of 
annual earnings.  This approach may have advantages over using analyst forecasts as a 
benchmark for investors’ expectations.  Specifically, the prior literature documents 
optimistic bias in analyst forecasts, as well as over-reaction to good news and under-
reaction to bad news (see Hou et al. [2010] for a review of this literature).  In validity 
tests, Hou et al. (2010) find that their model is able to outperform mean analyst forecasts 
in terms of bias and earnings response coefficients, concluding that their model-based 
earnings forecast is a more reliable proxy for expected earnings than a proxy based on 
analysts’ forecasts.  Specifically, following Hou et al. (2010), I estimate the following 
regression for each year t from 2005 to 2009 using pooled cross-sectional regressions: 
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 Eit = β0 + β1Vit-1 + β2Ait-1 + β3Dit-1 + β4DDit-1 + β5Eit-1 + β6NEGEit-1  
+ β7ACit-1 + εit          (5) 
Each regression uses ten years of data, with three years of data being the minimum 
requirement to stay in the sample.   In the following description, I include Compustat 
variable item names in parentheses following the definition of each variable.  Eit is 
earnings for firm i in year t (ib).  Vit-1 is the market value for firm i in year t-1 
(at+[prcc_f*csho]-ceq).  Ait-1 is total book assets (at).  Dit-1 is the dividend payment for 
the year (dvc).  DDit-1 is an indicator variable that equals 0 for dividend payers (dvc>0) 
and 1 for non-payers (dvc≤0).  NEGEit-1 is an indicator variable that equals 1 for firms 
with negative earnings, and zero otherwise.  ACit-1 is the firm’s operating accruals 
([∆act-∆che]-[∆lct-∆dlc-∆txp]-dp).  Consistent with Hou et al. (2010), I Winsorize all 
continuous variables in equation (5) at the .05% and 99.5% percentiles to reduce the 
influence of outliers. 
 Following Hou et al. (2010), for each year t I estimate expected earnings for year 
t+1 by multiplying the independent variables observed at the end of year t (i.e. the 
beginning of year t+1) with the coefficient estimates from equation (5).  I then calculate 
the earnings shock (ESHOCKit) in the current fiscal year period as actual earnings less 
expected earnings, scaled by total assets.  ESHOCKit is Winsorized at 1% and 99% to 
reduce the influence of outliers.   
 The second method used to estimate investors’ expectations of future earnings is 
analysts’ forecasts measured at the beginning of the fiscal year (i.e. before the release of 
any quarterly Risk Factor updates).  Specifically, I use the first mean forecast measured 
after the prior year’s earnings announcement date.  ANNFCSTERRit is calculated as actual 
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earnings less expected earnings, and is Winsorized at 1% and 99% to reduce the 
influence of outliers.  Finally, for tests related to H3B, ANNFCSTERR_10it is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the observation falls in the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of 
ANNFCSTERRit, and zero otherwise.  ANNFCSTERR_90it is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the observation falls in the top 10 percent of the distribution of ANNFCSTERRit, 
and zero otherwise. 
To test H3A, whether firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to 
experience future negative outcomes as of the current fiscal year end, I estimate the 
following two regressions: 
ESHOCKit = β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4STDROEit  
+ β5CHGEARNit + β6PRIORKLOSSit + εit        (6) 
ANNFCSTERRit = β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4STDROEit  
+ β5CHGEARNit + β6PRIORKLOSSit + β7NUMESTit  
+ β8PRICEit + εit       (7) 
All variables were defined above, with the exception that all variables are now measured 
on an annual basis.   If firms with quarterly Risk Factor updates are more likely to 
experience future adverse outcomes in the current fiscal year end, H3A predicts a 
negative coefficient on QRFIit (β1<0) in both regressions.   
To test H3B, whether firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to 
experience extreme negative earnings shocks as of the current fiscal year end, I estimate 
the following two logit models: 
P(XCEXTEMEit) = f(β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4STDROEit  
+ β5CHGEARNit + β6PRIORKLOSSit + εit)       (8) 
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P(ANNEXTREMEit) = f(β0 + β1QRFIit + β2LMVEit + β3BTMit + β4STDROEit  
+ β5CHGEARNit + β6PRIORKLOSSit + β7NUMESTit  
+ β8PRICEit + εit)       (9) 
XCEXTREMEit is either ESHOCK_10it or ESHOCK_90it.  ESHOCK_10it is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the observation falls in the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of 
ESHOCKit, and zero otherwise.  ESHOCK_90it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
observation falls in the top 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCKit, and zero 
otherwise.  ANNEXTREMEit is either ANNFCSTERR_10it or ANNFCSERR_90it.  All 
variables were defined above, with the exception that all variables are now measured on 
an annual basis.   If firms with quarterly Risk Factor updates are more likely to 
experience extreme negative earnings shocks in the current fiscal year end, H3B predicts 
a positive coefficient on QRFIit (β1>0) when ESHOCK_10it or ANNFCSTERR_10it are 
included as dependent variables.  H3B makes no prediction regarding the coefficient on 
QRFIit when ESHOCK_90it or ANNFCSTERR_90it are included as dependent variables, 
however β1>0 would be consistent with firms with Risk Factor updates in quarterly 
reports being more likely to experience extreme positive earnings shocks relative to firms 
without updates. 
 I also examine whether quarterly Risk Factor updates are able to predict earnings 
shocks for the second fiscal year end following a quarterly update.  These regressions 
have the same design as described in equations (6) through (9).  However, all dependent 
variables (ESHOCKit, ESHOCK_10it, ESHOCK_90it, ANNFCSTERRit, 
ANNFCSTERR_10it, and ANNFCSTERR_90it) are substituted with ESHOCKit+1, 
ESHOCK_10it+1, ESHOCK_90it+1, ANNFCSTERRit+1, ANNFCSTERR_10it+1, and 
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ANNFCSTERR_90it+1.  The predictions on these variables related to H3A and H3B are 
the same as their current fiscal year end counterparts.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SAMPLE AND RESULTS 
Sample 
As discussed in detail in Chapter III, I use the Python programming language to 
obtain Item 1A: Risk Factor disclosures and determine whether the firm has disclosed an 
update in the Risk Factors section of the 10-Q filing.  Other data sources include 
COMPUSTAT Xpressfeed annual file, CRSP daily stock return file, IBES unadjusted 
summary and actual files, and the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) 
Database.   
In addition to the data requirements discussed above, observations are excluded 
from the analysis for a number of reasons.  First, to eliminate updates that repeat previous 
10-Q filings in the same fiscal year, I drop all quarters in the same fiscal year period after 
a quarter in which a quarterly update has been identified.15  Second, I drop observations 
where the 10-Q filing date is listed as being on the same date as the fiscal period end date 
or before the fiscal period end date, as these are likely to be data errors.  Finally, to 
increase the power of my tests, I exclude observations where confounding pricing effects 
may influence the results.  Prior work has shown that the market reacts to quarterly 
filings that are the first release of earnings news (Easton and Zmijewski 1993; Li and 
Ramesh 2009).  To reduce the potential impact of additional news affecting stock prices, 
consistent with the design in Balsam et al. (2002), I exclude observations where the 
                                                 
15
 In untabulated analysis I relax this requirement and find similar results.  Specifically, I code quarters 
subsequent to an update as UPDATER=0 unless they increased by at least 100 words from the prior quarter 
in the same fiscal year period.  Relaxing this assumption increases my primary sample by 1,382 firm-
quarter observations. 
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earnings announcement date is less than seven days before the filing date.16  In addition, 
firms who file late may also confound the price reaction to the quarterly filing (Balsam et 
al. 2002; Li and Ramesh 2009).  Therefore, I exclude all observations where the 10-Q is 
filed after the filing deadline, which is forty days after the end of quarter for firms in my 
sample during this period of time.17  The primary sample in my analysis after considering 
all these data requirements is 7,212 firm-quarters spanning the years 2006-2009.   
Finally, to provide additional confidence in the Python extraction routine used in 
this study, I verified the classification of 200 randomly selected observations.  Of these 
200 observations, 81 were initially classified as UPDATER equal to 1.  I found six 
observations of the 200 that resulted in an initial misclassification.  However, utilizing 
the alternative cutoffs described above reduces the measurement error in these 200 
observations to five misclassifications and produces similar results.  Of the five 
misclassifications, two observations are misclassified due to the 10-Q containing 
additional risk factors in sections other than under the “Item 1A” heading.18  A third type 
of misclassification results from a firm using over 200 words in the Item 1A section to 
state there had been no updates.  The remaining two misclassifications were the result of 
                                                 
16
 In untabulated analysis I relax this requirement to exclude only observations where the earnings 
announcement date is less than 4 days before the filing date and obtain similar results with the exception 
that results related to negative earnings shocks in the quarter following the update become generally less 
significant. Relaxing this assumption increases my final sample by 1,334 firm-quarter observations. 
 
17
 In untabulated analysis I use an alternate methodology to control for non-timely filers.  Specifically, I 
include all non-timely filers that end up filing within one year of the fiscal quarter end date.  I create a 
separate indicator variable to capture these filers (NT=1) and add this variable to the regressions presented 
in equations (1)-(4) and (6)-(9).  Using this alternative methodology obtains similar results, and increases 
my sample by 1,053 firm-quarter observations.  
 
18
 One simply used the “Item 1A” section to refer to an alternate section containing an update.  The other 
10-Q did not contain the “Item 1A” section, but instead discussed “Item 1A” in a separate section titled 
“Forward Looking Statements” which contained an update. 
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my Python algorithm incorrectly extracting information.19  Overall, of the five 
misclassifications, two were incorrectly identified as UPDATER=1, and three contained 
updates but were incorrectly classified as not having an update (UPDATER=0).  
Therefore, I have no reason to believe that the potential measurement error in the sample 
results in some systematic misclassification resulting in a directional bias in the 
coefficients.  
 Table 1 gives the frequency of the sample by year (See Appendix C for all tables).  
Overall the sample size is fairly consistent across years.  However, fiscal year 2009 holds 
a much smaller percentage of the sample.  This is likely because data availability for 
some variables used in the analysis is only through December 31, 2009; leaving many 
2009 fiscal year-end reports out of the sample. 
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 
 Table 2 presents statistics examining potential industry-level clustering of updates 
throughout my sample period.  Prior research suggests that Risk Factors (at least at an 
annual level) may be somewhat broad and generic.  Thus, I examine the average number 
of Risk Factor updates by industry for each quarter.  Industry is defined by two-digit SIC 
code.  For an industry group to remain in the table, it must have at least 10 observations 
in a given quarter.  Panel A of Table 2 presents the percentage of firms providing 
quarterly updates within industry groups by quarter.  Specifically, the interpretation of the 
first entry in Panel A is as follows: For 2006Q1, there were 18 industries with at least 10 
firm-quarter observations in each industry grouping.  Of that set of 18 industries, the 
average percentage of firms presenting updates within each industry for that quarter was 
                                                 
19
 One Risk Factor section was not extracted by Python due to the firm’s addition of a hyphen in the section 
heading.  The other observation was incorrectly extracted due to the firm using the section heading “Item 
1A. Risk Factors” in other areas within the text.     
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28%.  In other words, on average, 28% of the firms within an industry group provide 
updates simultaneously in the same quarter, whereas 72% of the industry does not 
provide an update that quarter.  Panel B presents the percentage of updates within 
industry groups by quarter for all quarters in the sample period.  Overall, these results 
suggest that there may be some industry clustering of updates; however, it appears that 
there is a great deal of firm-specific variation in the updates being presented. 
 Table 3 presents univariate statistics for all variables included in analyses using 
quarterly data.  As expected, overall average cumulative abnormal returns around the 
filing date (CARf) and the earnings announcement date (CARea) are near zero.  Average 
UPDATER is 0.25, indicating that 25 percent of the observations are identified as 
containing a quarterly update in their 10-Q filing.  Mean QFCSTERRt+1 is slightly 
negative (-0.02), suggesting that the average firm misses expectations in the quarter 
following an update, based on an early forecast.  By construction QFCSTERR_10t+1 and 
QFCSTERR_90t+1 have means of 0.10, because they represent an indicator for firms that 
fall within the bottom and top ten percent of the distribution of QFCSTERRt+1, 
respectively.  Descriptive statistics for LMVE reveal that the sample is composed 
primarily of large firms.  This is as expected, since smaller reporting companies are 
excluded from the regulation – and thus from the sample.  Average NEWS is slightly 
positive, which is consistent with the average firm beating the most recent measure of 
analysts’ earnings expectations.  Average INSTPERC is approximately five by 
construction, since INSTPERC is the decile rank of the percentage of institutional 
ownership.  NUMEST is 1.78 suggesting that the average firm in the sample is followed 
by approximately 6 analysts (e1.78).   
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 Table 4 presents the pairwise correlation matrix of variables included in 
Equations (1) – (4).  This table also includes two variables that have not been described 
above.  I include LOSSt+1, which is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if there is a loss in 
the quarter following a Risk Factor update.  Also included is NEG_SPIt+1, which is an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 if there is a negative special item reported on the income 
statement in the quarter following a Risk Factor update.  BB_WORDS and UPDATER are 
highly positively correlated (0.87), suggesting that these variables capture similar aspects 
of quarterly Risk Factor updates (p-value=0.00), as expected.  Table 4 shows there is a 
small but statistically significant negative correlation (-0.05) between CARf and 
UPDATER (p-value=0.00).  In addition, there is a statistically significant negative 
correlation (-0.05) between CARf and BB_WORDS (p-value=0.00).  This indicates that 
firms revealing updates in their Risk Factor sections are likely to have lower cumulative 
abnormal returns around the 10-Q filing, consistent with H1.  The correlation between 
QFCSTERRt+1 (next quarter forecast error) and UPDATER (-0.03) is statistically 
significant (p-value=0.01), suggesting that Risk Factor updates in the current quarter may 
be associated with a negative shift in the distribution of next quarter earnings shocks 
(however, the correlation between QFCSTERRt+1 and BB_WORDS is statistically 
insignificantly different from zero).  Surprisingly, correlations between 
QFCSTERR_10t+1 and both measures of quarterly Risk Factor information are 
statistically insignificantly different from zero.  In terms of specific performance 
implications, UPDATER and BB_WORDS are significantly positively correlated with the 
existence of a loss in the next quarter (LOSSt+1) (p-values=0.00).  In addition, UPDATER 
and BB_WORDS are significantly positively correlated with the existence of a negative 
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special item in the next quarter (NEG_SPIt+1) (p-values=0.00).  Taken together, these 
results suggest that firms presenting Risk Factor updates may experience declines in 
performance in the quarter following the update.   
 Table 5 presents statistics for all variables included in Table 4 by whether a firm-
quarter observation contains an update (UPDATER=1) or not (UPDATER=0).  The table 
reports differences in mean values between the two groups, with significance levels 
calculated using two-tailed tests, where variances between the two groups are assumed to 
be unequal for most variables (as confirmed by variance ratio tests that are untabulated).20  
The table also reports differences in the medians with significance levels calculated using 
a non-parametric equality-of-medians test.  Both mean and median differences are 
statistically different for CARf (p-value=0.000 and p-value=0.001, respectively).  This 
evidence is consistent with H1, that firms issuing updates to their Risk Factors in 
quarterly reports have significantly lower returns relative to firms without changes to 
their Risk Factors.  Both mean and median tests reveal that the two groups are 
statistically different in regards to LOSSt+1 and NEG_SPIt+1.  These results are consistent 
with Table 4, suggesting that firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to 
experience negative shocks to performance in the quarter following a Risk Factor Update.  
BB_WORDS, by construction, is different across the two groups.  However, for firms 
classified as not having an update, the mean value of BB_WORDS is non-zero.  In fact, an 
average firm not classified as having an update contains approximately one word relating 
to the economic fundamentals of the firm.  This is likely due either to some of these 
words being used when an update does not exist or to a few misclassifications in the 
                                                 
20
 The variance ratio tests are unable to reject the null that the variances are equal for NEWS, LMVE, and 
PRICE between the two groups.  Accordingly, variances are assumed equal when calculating significance 
levels for differences in mean values for these variables. 
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entire sample.  The results relating to QFCSTERRt+1 are consistent with those discussed 
in Table 4.  The mean difference related to QFCSTERR_10t+1 is in the predicted 
direction, but is not statistically different from zero.  Finally, other differences between 
the two groups highlight that these variables should be included as control variables 
throughout the analysis. 
Multivariate Tests of H1 and H2 
 Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates of the regressions in Equations (1) and 
(2).  P-values are listed to the right of the coefficient using heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by firm.  Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the entire 
sample.  Consistent with H1, the coefficient on UPDATER (-0.0043) is significantly 
negative (p-value=0.000).  Also consistent with H1, the coefficient on BB_WORDS 
(-0.0011) is significantly negative (p-value=0.000).  These results can be interpreted as 
indicating that firms with Risk Factor updates in 10-Q filings have lower abnormal 
returns around the filing date of the 10-Q relative to firms without updates to their Risk 
Factors.   
Columns (3) and (4) present results including INSTPERC as a proxy for the level 
of information asymmetry, as well as an interaction between the primary variables of 
interest and INSTPERC.  Surprisingly, as information asymmetry increases, the effect of 
information in the Risk Factor update appears to remain constant.  This is evidenced by 
the lack of statistical significance for coefficients on INSTPERC*UPDATER and 
INSTPERC*BB_WORDS.  Columns (5) and (6) present results including NUMEST as a 
proxy for the level of information asymmetry.  While the coefficients on 
NUMEST*UPDATER and NUMEST*BB_WORDS are positive (as predicted), they are 
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only marginally significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.098 and p-value=0.108, 
respectively).  The coefficients on UPDATER and BB_WORDS remain significantly 
negative at conventional levels across all specifications. 
Taken together, the results presented in Table 6 are consistent with H1.  Firms 
with quarterly updates to their Risk Factor sections are likely to experience lower 
cumulative abnormal returns around the filing of the 10-Q relative to firms without Risk 
Factor updates.  These results are consistent using a dichotomous independent variable, 
as well as a continuous variable used to capture variations in the length of an update 
across firms’ Risk Factor disclosures.  However, the overall evidence presented in Table 
6 provides only weak support for H2.  In contrast with other forms of disclosure, it 
appears that quarterly Risk Factor updates contain useful information regardless of the 
level of information asymmetry between managers and investors.  Untabulated tests 
assessing the joint significance of the coefficient on the quarterly Risk Factor update 
information variable combined with the coefficient on the interaction term rejects the null 
hypothesis that the combined coefficients are equal to zero in all specifications, 
suggesting that regardless of the level of information asymmetry a Risk Factor update 
provides material negative information to the market.  
 In addition to statistical significance, the economic significance of a change in the 
risk environment for a firm is also meaningful.  Based on the coefficient estimate in 
column (1) of Table 6, the three-day return is 0.0043 (4.3 basis points) lower on average 
for firms with Risk Factor updates relative to firms without Risk Factor updates .  To 
provide additional perspective, from Table 3 we see that the average market value of a 
firm in the sample is 1.236 billion dollars (e7.12).  Therefore, for an average Risk Factor 
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update for an average firm, there is a 5.31 million dollar decrease in the value of the firm 
over the three days around the filing date relative to a firm without updates.   
 Overall, the results in Table 6 are consistent with Risk Factor updates in 10-Q 
reports providing valuable information to investors.  The lesser market reaction suggests 
that the market does view this information negatively, and impounds the information into 
price accordingly.  In addition, the amount of the difference in returns is economically 
significant. 
Multivariate Tests of H3A 
 Table 7 presents results from equation (3), testing whether firms with Risk Factor 
updates are more likely to experience negative adverse outcomes.  QFCSTERRt+1 is the 
dependent variable in columns (1) and (2), and I predict that firms with Risk Factor 
updates will have a higher likelihood of adverse outcomes, which will manifest in a 
negative shift in the distribution of earnings shocks relative to firms without Risk Factor 
updates.  Consistent with H3A, Column (1) presents a negative coefficient (-0.0180) on 
UPDATER (p-value=0.015).  This suggests that the presence of a quarterly Risk Factor 
update is associated with a downward shift in the overall distribution of earnings shocks 
in the quarter following a Risk Factor update.  However, the coefficient on BB_WORDS, 
(-0.0007) in Column (2), is of the predicted sign but is not significantly different from 
zero.   
 Table 8 also presents evidence related to H3A, where all variables are now 
measured at an annual level.  Table 8 presents estimates from equations (6) and (7), 
where the full distribution of annual earnings shocks is included as a dependent variable.  
As discussed above, there is now only one observation per firm-year.  Therefore, along 
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with additional data requirements, the sample size is significantly reduced for these tests.  
Panel A presents the results for the first fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update.  
Columns (1) and (2) present results using the cross-sectional model described in Equation 
(5) to generate the dependent variable ESHOCK.  The coefficient on UPDATER 
(-0.0211) is statistically significant (p-value=0.000), consistent with H3A.  Also 
consistent with H3A, the coefficient on BB_WORDS (-0.0047) is statistically significant 
(p-value=0.000).  Results in columns (3) and (4) using analysts’ forecasts as a benchmark 
for future earnings are also consistent with H3A, however the negative coefficient on 
BB_WORDS becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value 0.336).  Taken 
together, these results suggest that firms with a quarterly Risk Factor update during the 
fiscal year are more likely to experience negative outcomes, which negatively shift the 
distribution of earnings shocks at the current fiscal year end – regardless of the 
benchmark used.  Panel B presents results using the second fiscal year end following a 
Risk Factor update.  Inconsistent with H3A, in the second fiscal year following a 
quarterly Risk Factor update, none of the coefficients on UPDATER or BB_WORDS are 
negative.  However, all but one of the coefficients on UPDATER and BB_WORDS are 
indistinguishable from zero.  Overall, the results in Panel B do not provide support for 
H3A in the second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update, but provide weak 
support that firms presenting Risk Factor updates may experience positive earnings 
shocks in this time period. 
 As a whole, the results presented in this section are consistent with H3A.  Firms 
with Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience negative adverse outcomes 
relative to firms without updates to their Risk Factors section.  The evidence suggests this 
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effect occurs in the quarter following a Risk Factor update and in the first annual fiscal 
year end following a Risk Factor update.  Additionally, there is no evidence suggesting 
this effect persists into the second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update.  In 
addition, this section provides weak evidence that firms with Risk Factor updates are also 
more likely to experience stronger future positive earnings shocks.  Firms presenting 
information regarding future negative outcomes in quarterly reports may be more likely 
to also have positive earnings shocks in the second fiscal year end following a Risk 
Factor update, consistent with these firms having upside potential that is correlated with 
downside potential being presented in a Risk Factor update.   
Multivariate Tests of H3B 
 Table 9 Panel A presents results testing H3B using equation (4), concerning 
whether firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience extreme negative 
earnings shocks.  The coefficient on UPDATER (0.1802) in Column (1) is statistically 
significant (p-value=0.074).  Consistent with H3B, this evidence suggests that firms with 
Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience extreme negative earnings shocks.  
However, the coefficient on BB_WORDS in column (2) is insignificantly different from 
zero.  Together, this provides weak support for H3B in the quarter following a Risk 
Factor update.  Panel B presents evidence regarding whether a firm presenting a Risk 
Factor update is more likely to experience an extreme positive earnings shock.  Neither 
the coefficient on UPDATER or BB_WORDS is statistically different from zero.  This 
evidence suggests firms presenting a Risk Factor update are no more likely to experience 
an extreme positive earnings shock in the quarter following the update than firms without 
a Risk Factor update. 
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 Table 10 presents estimates from equations (8) and (9), also testing H3B. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Panel A present results using the cross-sectional model described 
in Equation (5) to generate the dependent variable ESHOCK_10, which is measured as of 
the first fiscal year end following a quarterly update.  The coefficient on UPDATER 
(0.7080) is statistically significant (p-value=0.000), consistent with H3B.  Also consistent 
with H3B, the coefficient on BB_WORDS (0.1343) is statistically significant 
(p-value=0.0000).  Results in columns (3) and (4) using analysts’ forecasts as a 
benchmark for future earnings are also consistent with H3B, however the positive 
coefficient on BB_WORDS becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero 
(p-value=0.440).  Taken together, these results suggest that firms with a quarterly Risk 
Factor update during the fiscal year are more likely to experience extreme negative 
earnings shocks as of the current fiscal year end – regardless of the benchmark used.  
Panel B presents results using ESHOCK_90 as the dependent variable.  Consistent with 
Table 9, none of the coefficients on UPDATER or BB_WORDS are statistically different 
from zero.  This evidence suggests firms presenting a Risk Factor update are no more 
likely to experience an extreme positive earnings shock, as of the current fiscal year end, 
than firms without a Risk Factor update. 
 Finally, Table 11 presents evidence regarding extreme earnings shocks in the 
second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update.  Panel A presents evidence using 
ESHOCK_10t+1 and ANNFCSTERR_10t+1 as dependent variables.  Column (4) presents 
the only statistically significant coefficient (-0.0645) on either UPDATER or BB_WORDS 
(p-value=0.05), providing weak evidence that firms that present a Risk Factor update in 
their quarterly report are less likely to experience extreme negative earnings shocks in the 
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second fiscal year end following the update.  In addition, Panel B columns (1) and (2) 
provide support that firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience 
extreme positive earnings shocks.  However, the coefficients on UPDATER and 
BB_WORDS in columns (3) and (4) are not statistically different from zero when using 
analyst forecasts as the measure of expected earnings.   
 As a whole, the results presented in this section are consistent with H3B.  Firms 
with Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience extreme negative earnings shocks 
relative to firms without updates to their Risk Factors section.  Consistent with the 
evidence relating to H3A, the evidence suggests this effect occurs in the quarter 
following a Risk Factor update and in the first annual fiscal year end following a Risk 
Factor update.  However, there is no evidence suggesting this effect persists into the 
second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update.  In addition, this section provides 
some evidence that firms with Risk Factor updates are also more likely to experience 
stronger future positive earnings shocks, specifically in the second fiscal year end period 
following the Risk Factor update.  This suggests that firms that disclose Risk Factor 
updates may also have greater upside potential.   
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CHAPTER V 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 As discussed in Chapter III, I assume that relatively long quarterly updates should 
be included in the sample and classified as updates.  However, as noted above, to the 
extent these relatively long disclosures are not truly updates, my inferences may be 
biased.  To provide further evidence that the results presented in Chapter IV are not 
caused by an assumption related to extreme values included in the sample, I run the 
multivariate analyses again, excluding all observations where the length of the quarterly 
update is greater than 95 percent of the most recent annual presentation of Risk Factors.  
This Chapter presents the results using this alternative methodology. 
 Table 12 presents the results related to H1 and H2.  Consistent with H1, the 
coefficient on UPDATER (-0.0031) is statistically significant (p-value=0.034), suggesting 
that firms presenting updates to their Risk Factors in quarterly reports are more likely to 
have lower abnormal returns around the filing of the 10-Q relative to firms not presenting 
updates.  In addition, the coefficient on BB_WORDS (-0.0008) is statistically different 
from zero (p-value=0.049).  The tests of H2, whether the level of information asymmetry 
attenuates the results, provide no support for H2.  Taken together, the results in Table 11 
still support H1, and overall inferences related to H2 are consistent with the findings 
presented in Chapter IV. 
 Table 13 and Table 14 present results related to tests of H3A.  I find stronger 
support for H3A in the quarter following an update as well as for the first fiscal year end 
following an update.  However, I continue to find no support for H3A in the second fiscal 
year end following an update.  Taken together, these findings are consistent with those 
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presented in Chapter IV, and suggest that firms presenting updates to their Risk Factor 
disclosures in quarterly reports are more likely to experience adverse outcomes relative to 
firms without an update to their Risk Factor disclosure in the quarter following a Risk 
Factor update and as of the first fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update. 
 Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17 present results related to the relative strength of 
future earnings shocks.  These results are still consistent with H3B, providing support 
that firms with Risk Factor updates are more likely to experience extreme negative 
earnings shocks.  However, using this alternative methodology, there is no longer any 
evidence supporting firms with Risk Factor updates having more extreme positive 
earnings shocks, inconsistent with the results presented earlier. 
Overall, the inferences drawn from this chapter are similar to those drawn earlier, 
suggesting that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of relatively large Risk Factor 
updates.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study I examine whether recently required Risk Factor update disclosures 
in quarterly reports provide investors with timely information regarding potential future 
negative outcomes.  Specifically, I examine whether the existence of a quarterly update to 
a firm’s Risk Factor disclosure from its 10-K filing generates a lower market reaction to 
the 10-Q filing relative to firms without updates.  Consistent with this prediction I find 
that there is a negative association between providing an update to the Risk Factors 
section and Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the filing date.  This relationship holds 
when using a continuous measure that attempts to capture the number of words relating to 
the economic fundamentals of the firm, using the list of terms described in Balakrishnan 
and Bartov (2008).   
 Contrary to expectations, the relationship between quarterly Risk Factor updates 
and returns does not appear to be materially impacted by the level of information 
asymmetry facing the firm.  This suggests that quarterly updates to Risk Factors are 
informative to investors across a general set of firms where the regulation is applicable.   
 Finally, I provide evidence that quarterly Risk Factor updates are associated with 
future negative outcomes, resulting in a higher propensity to have extreme negative 
earnings shocks.  In addition, I find weak evidence that quarterly Risk Factor updates are 
associated with future extreme positive earnings shocks.  Taken together, these results are 
consistent with stock price reactions to quarterly updates being at least partially 
attributable to revisions in expected cash flows estimates.  I find that firms with quarterly 
Risk Factor updates are likely to experience negative earnings shocks in the next quarter, 
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and at the current fiscal year end relative to firms without quarterly Risk Factor updates.  
This suggests that, on average, there are material imminent threats to performance that 
are communicated via Risk Factor updates.  The weak results related to firms with 
quarterly Risk Factor updates experiencing positive earnings shocks are indicative of 
firms with large downside potential also holding upside potential.  
 Overall these findings contribute to the literature in three ways.  First, I provide 
evidence that the regulation required by the SEC does provide useful information to 
investors.  Second, I show that the Risk Factors section has value outside of an IPO 
setting, where most prior research has focused.  Third, I contribute to existing literature 
on market reactions to 10-Q filings by documenting a setting where additional valuable 
information is released at the time of filing.  To my knowledge, this is the only study 
examining the information content of quarterly Risk Factor updates since this information 
was required to be disclosed by the SEC.     
 While this study and others like it are able to conclude that there are various types 
of information in Risk Factor disclosures overall, a remaining unanswered important 
question is whether the disclosure environment actually changed as a result of the 
regulation.  Based on the findings in this study, Risk Factor disclosures are able to predict 
short-term future negative earnings shocks.  This suggests that on average the risk factors 
being presented are reasonably certain, material, and are likely to occur sooner rather 
than later.  Therefore, while managers appear to be using this outlet to pre-empt bad 
news, it is not clear that these managers would not have taken advantage of another outlet 
to provide similar warnings to investors.  Thus, future research examining whether the 
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mandate compels managers to disclose information that otherwise would not have been 
disclosed would likely add value to the current body of knowledge.   
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APPENDIX A 
RISK FACTOR UPDATE EXAMPLE 
Lincoln National Corporation, 2007 Q3 
Item 1A. Risk Factors.  
Our business faces significant risks. The risks described below update the risk factors described in 
our 2006 Form 10-K and should be read in conjunction with those risk factors. The risks and uncertainties 
described below and in the 2006 Form 10-K are not the only ones facing our company. Additional risks and 
uncertainties not presently known to us or that we currently deem immaterial may also impair our business 
operations. If any of these risks actually occur, our business, financial condition and results of operations 
could be materially affected. In that case, the value of our securities could decline substantially.  
Changes in U.S. federal income tax law could make some of our products less attractive to consumers 
and increase our tax costs.  
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (“EGTRRA”) as well as the Jobs 
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 contain provisions that have and will (in the absence of 
any further legislation) continue, near term, to significantly lower individual tax rates. These may have the 
effect of reducing the benefits of deferral on the build-up of value of annuities and life insurance products. 
EGTRRA also includes provisions that will eliminate, over time, the estate, gift and generation-skipping 
taxes and partially eliminate the step-up in basis rule applicable to property held in a decedent’s estate. 
Many of these provisions expire in 2010, unless extended. The Bush Administration continues to propose 
that many of the foregoing rate reductions, as well as elimination of the estate tax, be made permanent, and 
continues to propose several tax-favored savings initiatives, that, if enacted by Congress, could also 
adversely affect the sale of our annuity, life and tax-qualified retirement products and increase the 
surrender of such products. Although we cannot predict the overall effect on the sales of our products of the 
tax law changes included in these Acts, some of these changes might hinder our sales and result in the 
increased surrender of insurance products.  
In addition, changes to the Internal Revenue Code, administrative rulings or court decisions could 
increase our effective tax rate. In this regard, on August 16, 2007, the Internal Revenue Service issued a 
revenue ruling which purports, among other things, to modify the calculation of separate account deduction 
for dividends received by life insurance companies. Subsequently, the IRS issued another revenue ruling 
that suspended the August 16 ruling and announced a new regulation project on the issue. The current 
separate account deduction for dividends calculation lowered the effective tax rate by approximately 4% 
for the nine months ended September 30, 2007.  
We face a risk of non-collectibility of reinsurance, which could materially affect our results of 
operations.  
We follow the insurance practice of reinsuring with other insurance and reinsurance companies a 
portion of the risks under the policies written by our insurance subsidiaries (known as ceding). At the end 
of 2006, we have ceded approximately $334 billion of life insurance in-force to reinsurers for reinsurance 
protection. Although reinsurance does not discharge our subsidiaries from their primary obligation to pay 
policyholders for losses insured under the policies we issue, reinsurance does make the assuming reinsurer 
liable to the insurance subsidiaries for the reinsured portion of the risk. As of September 30, 2007, we had 
$8.2 billion of reinsurance receivables from reinsurers for paid and unpaid losses, for which they are 
obligated to reimburse us under our reinsurance contracts. Of this amount, $4.3 billion relates to the sale of 
our reinsurance business to Swiss Re in 2001 through an indemnity reinsurance agreement. During 2004, 
Swiss Re funded a trust to support this business. The balance in the trust changes as a result of ongoing 
reinsurance activity and was $1.8 billion at September 30, 2007. In addition, should Swiss Re’s financial 
strength ratings drop below either S&P AA- or AM Best A or their NAIC risk based capital ratio fall below 
250%, assets equal to the reserves supporting business reinsured must be placed into a trust according to 
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pre-established asset quality guidelines. Furthermore, approximately $2.1 billion of the Swiss Re treaties 
are funds-withheld structures where we have a right of offset on assets backing the reinsurance receivables.  
Included in the business sold to Swiss Re through indemnity reinsurance in 2001 was disability 
income business. Swiss Re is disputing its obligation to pay approximately $80 million of reinsurance 
recoverables on certain of this income disability business. We have agreed to arbitrate this dispute with 
Swiss Re. Although the outcome of the arbitration is uncertain, we currently believe that it is probable that 
we will ultimately collect the full amount of the reinsurance recoverable from Swiss Re and that Swiss Re 
will ultimately remain at risk on all of its obligations on the disability income business that it acquired from 
us in 2001.  
During the third quarter of 2006 one of LNL’s reinsurers, Scottish Re Group Ltd (“Scottish Re”), 
received rating downgrades from various rating agencies. At September 30, 2007, of the $900 million of 
fixed annuity business that LNL reinsures with Scottish Re, approximately 70% is reinsured through the 
use of modified coinsurance treaties, in which LNL possesses the investments that support the reserves 
ceded to Scottish Re. For its annuity business ceded on a coinsurance basis, Scottish Re had previously 
established an irrevocable investment trust for the benefit of LNL that supports the reserves. In addition to 
fixed annuities, LNL has approximately $101 million of policy liabilities on the life insurance business it 
reinsures with Scottish Re. Scottish Re continues to perform under its contractual responsibilities to LNL.  
The balance of the reinsurance is due from a diverse group of reinsurers. The collectibility of 
reinsurance is largely a function of the solvency of the individual reinsurers. We perform annual credit 
reviews on our reinsurers, focusing on, among other things, financial capacity, stability, trends and 
commitment to the reinsurance business. We also require assets in trust, letters of credit or other acceptable 
collateral to support balances due from reinsurers not authorized to transact business in the applicable 
jurisdictions. Despite these measures, a reinsurer’s insolvency, inability or unwillingness to make payments 
under the terms of a reinsurance contract, especially Swiss Re, could have a material adverse effect on our 
results of operations and financial condition.  
Changes in accounting standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board or other 
standard-setting bodies may adversely affect our financial statements.  
Our financial statements are subject to the application of U.S. GAAP, which is periodically revised 
and/or expanded. Accordingly, from time to time we are required to adopt new or revised accounting 
standards or guidance issued by recognized authoritative bodies, including the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board. It is possible that future accounting standards we are required to adopt could change the 
current accounting treatment that we apply to our consolidated financial statements and that such changes 
could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. For example, we 
are currently examining the impact of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 “Fair Value 
Measurements” and No. 159 “The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities.” For 
more information on Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 and No. 159 and other 
accounting pronouncements, see “Part I—Item 1. Financial Statements—Note 2 to the Consolidated 
Financial Statements.”  
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURE 
Figure 1.  Quarterly Timeline 
This figure presents sequence of events relative to Quarter t.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Earnings of Quartert released
End of Quartert
Anayst EPS forecast for Quartert+1
End of Quartert+1
10-Q released for Quartert
 62 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
TABLES 
Table 1.  Sample Frequency by Fiscal Year 
 
This table presents the sample frequency by fiscal year.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Year Frequency Percent
2006 1,937 26.9
2007 2,462 34.1
2008 1,776 24.6
2009 1,037 14.4
Total Sample 7,212           100.0
 63 
 
 
Table 2.  Industry Clustering 
 
This table reports the average percentage of firms in the same industry with updates in a given 
quarter.  Industry groups are defined by 2-digit SIC code.  Only groups with at least 10 
observations in a quarter were summarized below. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Percentage of updates within industry groups by quarter
Quarter N Mean StdDev p25 p50 p75
2006Q1 18            0.28 0.21 0.11 0.20 0.43
2006Q2 19            0.34 0.19 0.18 0.28 0.50
2006Q3 20            0.37 0.18 0.21 0.34 0.55
2007Q1 23            0.28 0.15 0.13 0.28 0.39
2007Q2 21            0.36 0.15 0.27 0.36 0.50
2007Q3 23            0.34 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.52
2008Q1 18            0.24 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.36
2008Q2 19            0.33 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.50
2008Q3 16            0.55 0.14 0.48 0.57 0.66
2009Q1 16            0.36 0.17 0.21 0.33 0.48
2009Q2 14            0.36 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.56
2009Q3 2             0.61 0.02 0.60 0.61 0.63
Panel B: Percentage of updates within industry groups by quarter for all quarters
Quarter N Mean StdDev p25 p50 p75
All 209          0.34 0.19 0.18 0.30 0.52
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Table 3.  Univariate Statistics 
 
This table reports destiptive statistics for all variables included in quarterly analyses.  Statistics 
presented include the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation, and key points in the 
distribution.  UPDATER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm included an update to its 
Risk Factors section in its 10-Q filing.  BB_WORDS is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of words capturing the economic fundamentals described in the quarterly Risk Factors 
section in the 10-Q filing.  CARf is the cumulative abnormal return around the filing date of the 
10-Q (specifically spanning the three-day window of 0 to +2).  QFCSTERRt+1 is forecast error for 
the next quarter.  QFCSTERR_10t+1 is an indicator equal to 1 if an obseravtion falls into the 
bottom 10 percent of the distribution of QFCSTERRt+1, and zero otherwise.  QFCSTERR_90t+1 is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation falls into the top 10 percent of the distribution of 
QFCSTERRt+1, and zero otherwise.  NEWS is earnings surprise for the quarter, calculated as the 
difference between the last mean analyst forecast released before the earnings announcement and 
actual earnings per share.  CARea is the cumulative abnormal return around the earnings 
announcement date (specifically spanning the three-day window of -1 to +1).  LMVE is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity.  BTM is the book to market ratio.  INSTPERC is 
the decile rank of the percentage of institutional ownership.  STDROE is the standard deviation of 
the return on equity measured over the previous five years.  NUMEST is the natural logarithm of 
the number of analysts following the firm.  CHGEARN is the seasonal change in earnings, scaled 
by earnings from the same quarter in the prior year.  PRIORQLOSS is an indicator equal to 1 if 
earnings for the same quarter in the prior fiscal year is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  PRICE 
is the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
 
 
1NUMEST is measured at different points in time throughout the analysis.  The variable presented here is as 
described in Equation (2) and Equation (4).  
 
Variable N Mean StdDev p25 p50 p75
UPDATER 7,212       0.25 - - - -
BB_WORDS 7,212       1.54 1.90 0.00 0.69 1.95
CARf 7,212       0.002 0.041 -0.019 0.000 0.022
QFCSTERRt+1 7,195       -0.02 0.24 -0.04 0.01 0.04
QFCSTERR_10t+1 7,195       0.10 - - - -
QFCSTERR_90t+1 7,195       0.10 - - - -
NEWS 7,212       0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.04
CARea 7,212       0.003 0.082 -0.038 0.001 0.044
LMVE 7,212       7.12 1.46 5.98 6.99 8.03
BTM 7,212       0.53 0.35 0.29 0.46 0.68
INSTPERC 7,212       5.40 2.73 3.00 5.50 8.00
STDROE 7,212       0.28 1.05 0.02 0.05 0.12
NUMEST1 7,212       1.78 0.81 1.39 1.95 2.40
CHGEARN 7,212       -0.08 2.35 -0.36 0.01 0.30
PRIORQLOSS 7,212       0.12 - - - -
PRICE 7,212       30.50 20.09 16.00 26.32 39.84
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Table 4.  Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents a correlation matrix (p-values presented in parentheses below correlation coefficients).  LOSSt+1 is an indicator variables for 
whether there is a loss in the next quarter.  NEG_SPIt+1 is an indicator for whether there is a negative special item reported in the income statement 
in the next quarter.  All other variables were defined in Table 3. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
 
1NUMEST is measured at different points in time throughout the analysis.  The variable presented here is as described in Equation (2) and Equation (4).  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 UPDATER
2 BB_WORDS 0.87
(0.00)
3 CARf -0.05 -0.05
(0.00) (0.00)
4 QFCSTERRt+1 -0.03 0.00 0.03
(0.01) (0.96) (0.03)
5 QFCSTERR_10t+1 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.67
(0.13) (0.17) (0.42) (0.00)
6 QFCSTERR_90t+1 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.41 -0.11
(0.26) (0.13) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00)
7 LOSSt+1 0.19 0.20 -0.01 -0.34 0.31 -0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
8 NEG_SPIt+1 0.09 0.09 -0.02 -0.09 0.09 -0.04 0.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
9 NEWS -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.30 -0.20 0.21 -0.19 -0.06
(0.08) (0.52) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
10 CARea 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.09 -0.06 0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.29
(0.95) (0.97) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
11 LMVE -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.11 -0.20 0.15 0.13 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70)
12 BTM -0.01 -0.04 0.11 -0.23 0.25 0.07 0.23 0.07 -0.15 0.00 -0.25
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00)
13 INSTPERC 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.26 -0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.24) (0.35) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)
14 STDROE 0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.18 0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.95) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.72) (0.00) (0.00)
15 NUMEST1 0.10 0.11 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.62 -0.15 0.32 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)
16 CHGEARN -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.13 -0.03 0.12 0.03 0.07 -0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.62) (0.32)
17 PRIORQLOSS 0.20 0.23 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.40 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.20 -0.02 -0.01 0.14 -0.08 -0.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) (0.40) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.80) (0.00) (0.09) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
18 PRICE -0.12 -0.15 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.18 -0.26 0.00 0.15 -0.01 0.61 -0.23 0.19 -0.07 0.27 0.08 -0.27
(0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 5.  Statistics by UPDATER 
 
This table reports destiptive statistics by UPDATER as well as tests of differences in mean and median values.  Statistics presented include the 
number of observations (N), mean, and median.  P-values for differences in means are calculated using two-tailed tests where variances between 
the groups are assumed to be unequal for all variables except NEWS, LMVE, and PRICE.  This assumption is confirmed via untabulated variance 
ratio tests.  P-values for differences in median are calculated based on a non-parametric equality of median test.  All variables were defined in 
Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
 
 
1NUMEST is measured at different points in time throughout the analysis.  The variable presented here is as described in Equation (2) and Equation (4).  
 
 
 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
CARf 5,401       0.004 0.001 1,811       -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.001
BB_WORDS 5,401       0.59 0.69 1,811       4.39 4.41 3.80 0.000 3.71 0.000
QFCSTERRt+1 5,386       -0.02 0.01 1,809       -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.006 0.00 0.484
QFCSTERR_10t+1 5,386       0.10 - 1,809       0.11 - 0.01 0.129 - -
QFCSTERR_90t+1 5,386       0.10 - 1,809       0.09 - -0.01 0.261 - -
LOSSt+1 5,401       0.12 - 1,811       0.28 - 0.16 0.000 - -
NEG_SPIt+1 5,346       0.30 - 1,798       0.40 - 0.10 0.000 - -
NEWS 5,401       0.01 0.01 1,811       0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.083 0.00 0.489
CARea 5,401       0.003 0.001 1,811       0.003 0.000 0.000 0.953 -0.001 0.807
LMVE 5,401       7.14 7.03 1,811       7.04 6.86 -0.10 0.009 -0.17 0.001
BTM 5,401       0.53 0.47 1,811       0.52 0.43 -0.01 0.256 -0.03 0.003
INSTPERC 5,401       5.30 5.00 1,811       5.71 6.00 0.41 0.000 1.00 0.000
STDROE 5,401       0.24 0.04 1,811       0.41 0.08 0.16 0.000 0.04 0.000
NUMEST1 5,401       1.73 1.79 1,811       1.91 1.95 0.18 0.000 0.15 0.000
CHGEARN 5,401       -0.03 0.03 1,811       -0.22 -0.06 -0.18 0.012 -0.08 0.000
PRIORQLOSS 5,401       0.08 - 1,811       0.23 - 0.15 0.000 - -
PRICE 5,401       31.95 27.64 1,811       26.18 20.86 -5.77 0.000 -6.78 0.000
DIFFERENCE 
IN MEDIANS P-VALUE
UPDATER=0 UPDATER=1 DIFFERENCE 
IN MEANS P-VALUE
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Table 6.  Regressions of CARf on UPDATER or BB_WORDS 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of CARf on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control variables.  Columns (1) and (2) 
present regression results for tests of H1 using Equation (1).  Columns (3)-(6) include regression results for tests of H2 using Equation (2).  All 
variables were defined in Table 3.  P-values (to the right of coefficient estimates ) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by firm.   
 
 
Variable
UPDATER -0.0043 (0.000) -0.0072 (0.013) -0.0088 (0.004)
BB_WORDS -0.0011 (0.000) -0.0015 (0.023) -0.0021 (0.002)
LMVE -0.0004 (0.195) -0.0005 (0.170) -0.0003 (0.373) -0.0003 (0.325) -0.0007 (0.138) -0.0007 (0.096)
BTM 0.0131 (0.000) 0.0130 (0.000) 0.0132 (0.000) 0.0130 (0.000) 0.0131 (0.000) 0.0130 (0.000)
NEWS 0.0104 (0.037) 0.0105 (0.034) 0.0106 (0.033) 0.0107 (0.032) 0.0108 (0.031) 0.0109 (0.029)
CARea -0.0176 (0.024) -0.0176 (0.024) -0.0175 (0.025) -0.0176 (0.024) -0.0177 (0.023) -0.0179 (0.022)
INSTPERC -0.0004 (0.058) -0.0004 (0.113)
INSTPERC*UPDATER 0.0006 (0.226)
INSTPERC*BB_WORDS 0.0001 (0.447)
NUMEST 0.0000 (0.975) 0.0000 (0.984)
NUMEST*UPDATER 0.0024 (0.098)
NUMEST*BB_WORDS 0.0005 (0.108)
CONSTANT -0.0003 (0.923) 0.0006 (0.843) 0.0009 (0.779) 0.0016 (0.599) 0.0012 (0.706) 0.0026 (0.415)
N 7,212        7,212        7,212        7,212        7,212        7,212        
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
CARf CARf CARf CARf
Whole Sample INSTPERC Interaction NUMEST Interaction
CARf CARf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 7.  Regressions of QFCSTERRt+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of QFCSTERRt+1 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS and other control variables.  All variables were defined in Table 3.  P-values (to the 
right of coefficient estimates ) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by firm.   
   
 
 
 
 
Variable
UPDATER -0.0180 (0.015)
BB_WORDS -0.0007 (0.672)
LMVE 0.0065 (0.104) 0.0067 (0.098)
BTM -0.1677 (0.000) -0.1676 (0.000)
STDROE -0.0085 (0.004) -0.0088 (0.004)
CHGEARN 0.0044 (0.007) 0.0044 (0.007)
PRIORQLOSS -0.0139 (0.274) -0.0173 (0.181)
NUMEST -0.0059 (0.392) -0.0070 (0.311)
PRICE -0.0007 (0.028) -0.0007 (0.036)
CONSTANT 0.0601 (0.018) 0.0572 (0.024)
N 7,195        7,195        
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06
QFCSTERRt+1 QFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2)
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Table 8.  Regressions of ESHOCK, ANNFCSTERR, ESHOCKt+1 and ANNFCSTERR t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from regressions of ESHOCK and ANNFCSTERR on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control 
variables.  Panel B presents coefficient estimates from regressions of ESHOCK
 t+1 and ANNFCSTERR t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other 
control variables.  ESHOCK is forecast error for the current year using predicted earnings from a cross-sectional regression model.  ANNFCSTERR 
is forecast error for the current year using the first mean forecast of the year.  All other variables were defined in Table 3 with the exception that 
they are now measured on an annual basis.  P-values (to the right of coefficient estimates) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER -0.0211 (0.000) -0.0892 (0.003)
BB_WORDS -0.0047 (0.000) -0.0065 (0.336)
LMVE 0.0065 (0.000) 0.0064 (0.000) 0.0828 (0.000) 0.0842 (0.000)
BTM -0.0407 (0.000) -0.0413 (0.000) -0.8457 (0.000) -0.8450 (0.000)
STDROE -0.0001 (0.952) -0.0004 (0.865) -0.0224 (0.156) -0.0235 (0.138)
CHGEARN 0.0071 (0.000) 0.0071 (0.000) 0.0313 (0.000) 0.0315 (0.000)
PRIORKLOSS -0.0110 (0.227) -0.0098 (0.283) 0.0099 (0.850) -0.0005 (0.992)
NUMEST -0.1234 (0.000) -0.1309 (0.000)
PRICE -0.0045 (0.002) -0.0044 (0.002)
CONSTANT -0.0219 (0.152) -0.0196 (0.202) 0.1106 (0.342) 0.0880 (0.450)
N 2,937        2,937        4,058        4,058        
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.19
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK ESHOCK ANNFCSTERR ANNFCSTERR
Panel A: The first fiscal year end following a quarterly update
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: The second fiscal year end following a quarterly update
Variable
UPDATER 0.0041 (0.363) 0.0458 (0.338)
BB_WORDS 0.0008 (0.443) 0.0281 (0.004)
LMVE -0.0049 (0.008) -0.0049 (0.008) 0.0632 (0.006) 0.0651 (0.005)
BTM -0.0228 (0.011) -0.0227 (0.011) -0.7764 (0.000) -0.7693 (0.000)
STDROE 0.0007 (0.780) 0.0008 (0.766) -0.0254 (0.166) -0.0250 (0.176)
CHGEARN -0.0056 (0.000) -0.0056 (0.000) 0.0036 (0.634) 0.0037 (0.621)
PRIORKLOSS -0.0510 (0.000) -0.0511 (0.000) 0.1235 (0.030) 0.0987 (0.081)
NUMEST -0.0267 (0.448) -0.0389 (0.270)
PRICE -0.0085 (0.000) -0.0082 (0.000)
CONSTANT 0.0420 (0.011) 0.0417 (0.012) -0.0980 (0.500) -0.1399 (0.334)
N 2,248        2,248        3,092        3,092        
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCKt+1 ESHOCKt+1 ANNFCSTERRt+1 ANNFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 9.  Regressions of QFCSTERR_10t+1 and QFCSTERR_90t+1 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of QFCSTERR_10t+1 on UPDATER 
or BB_WORDS and other control variables.  Panel B presents coefficient estimates from logit 
regressions of QFCSTERR_90
 t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control variables.  All 
variables were defined in Table 3.  P-values (to the right of coefficient estimates ) are calculated 
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 
 
 
Variable
UPDATER 0.1802 (0.074)
BB_WORDS -0.0072 (0.775)
LMVE 0.0005 (0.994) -0.0023 (0.969)
BTM 2.1424 (0.000) 2.1422 (0.000)
STDROE 0.1199 (0.023) 0.1211 (0.022)
CHGEARN -0.0433 (0.027) -0.0440 (0.026)
PRIORQLOSS 0.4430 (0.007) 0.4828 (0.004)
NUMEST -0.1627 (0.057) -0.1465 (0.089)
PRICE 0.0239 (0.000) 0.0236 (0.000)
CONSTANT -4.1586 (0.000) -4.1068 (0.000)
N 7,195        7,195        
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.11
Panel A: Dependent variable is an indicator variable representing the bottom 
10 percent of the distribution of QFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2)
QFCSTERR_10t+1 QFCSTERR_10t+1
Variable
UPDATER 0.0242 (0.814)
BB_WORDS 0.0125 (0.611)
LMVE 0.2577 (0.000) 0.2581 (0.000)
BTM 1.1714 (0.000) 1.1739 (0.000)
STDROE 0.1071 (0.001) 0.1073 (0.001)
CHGEARN 0.0112 (0.556) 0.0112 (0.553)
PRIORQLOSS 0.7041 (0.000) 0.6958 (0.000)
NUMEST -0.4744 (0.000) -0.4770 (0.000)
PRICE 0.0263 (0.000) 0.0264 (0.000)
CONSTANT -4.9904 (0.000) -5.0040 (0.000)
N 7,195        7,195        
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.08
Panel B: Dependent variable is an indicator variable representing the top 10 
percent of the distribution of QFCSTERRt+1
QFCSTERR_90t+1 QFCSTERR_90t+1
(1) (2)
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Table 10.  Regressions of ESHOCK_10, ANNFCSTERR_10, ESHOCK_90, and ANNFCSTERR_90 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_10 and ANNFCSTERR_10 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other 
control variables.  Panel B presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_90 and ANNFCSTERR_90 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS and other control variables.  ESHOCK_10 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the bottom 10 percent of the 
distribution of ESHOCK, and zero otherwise.   ESHOCK_90 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the top 10 percent of the 
distribution of ESHOCK, and zero otherwise.  ESHOCK is forecast error for the current year using predicted earnings from a cross-sectional 
regression model.  ANNFCSTERR_10 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of 
ANNFCSTERR, and zero otherwise.   ANNFCSTERR _90 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the top 10 percent of the 
distribution of ANNFCSTERR, and zero otherwise.  ANNFCSTERR is forecast error for the current year using the first mean forecast of the year.  
All other variables were defined in Table 3 with the exception that they are now measured on an annual basis.  P-values (to the right of coefficient 
estimates) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER 0.7080 (0.000) 0.3209 (0.008)
BB_WORDS 0.1343 (0.000) 0.0220 (0.440)
LMVE -0.4070 (0.000) -0.4047 (0.000) -0.1050 (0.125) -0.1080 (0.112)
BTM 0.3424 (0.050) 0.3498 (0.047) 2.0140 (0.000) 2.0095 (0.000)
STDROE 0.1002 (0.013) 0.1093 (0.008) 0.0988 (0.148) 0.1010 (0.141)
CHGEARN -0.1129 (0.000) -0.1133 (0.000) -0.0720 (0.000) -0.0729 (0.000)
PRIORKLOSS 0.8864 (0.000) 0.8636 (0.000) 0.3121 (0.073) 0.3438 (0.049)
NUMEST 0.1717 (0.103) 0.1983 (0.060)
PRICE 0.0268 (0.000) 0.0265 (0.000)
CONSTANT -0.5569 (0.262) -0.5621 (0.259) -4.3963 (0.000) -4.3172 (0.000)
N 2,937        2,937        4,058        4,058        
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.19
Panel A: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK or 
ANNFCSTERR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK_10 ESHOCK_10 ANNFCSTERR_10 ANNFCSTERR_10
 75 
 
 
Table 10 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER -0.0465 (0.745) -0.1743 (0.145)
BB_WORDS 0.0000 (0.999) -0.0292 (0.312)
LMVE -0.2658 (0.000) -0.2653 (0.000) 0.4163 (0.000) 0.4176 (0.000)
BTM -0.8870 (0.000) -0.8850 (0.000) -0.0509 (0.728) -0.0555 (0.704)
STDROE 0.1093 (0.014) 0.1089 (0.015) 0.0615 (0.185) 0.0595 (0.199)
CHGEARN 0.0571 (0.006) 0.0569 (0.006) 0.0444 (0.038) 0.0438 (0.040)
PRIORKLOSS 0.8555 (0.000) 0.8440 (0.000) 1.1410 (0.000) 1.1364 (0.000)
NUMEST -0.5790 (0.000) -0.5826 (0.000)
PRICE 0.0210 (0.000) 0.0209 (0.000)
CONSTANT -0.2527 (0.666) -0.2773 (0.638) -5.0224 (0.000) -5.0293 (0.000)
N 2,937        2,937        4,058        4,058        
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09
Panel B: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the top 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK or 
ANNFCSTERR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK_90 ESHOCK_90 ANNFCSTERR_90 ANNFCSTERR_90
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Table 11.  Regressions of ESHOCK_10t+1, ANNFCSTERR_10 t+1, ESHOCK_90 t+1, and ANNFCSTERR_90 t+1 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_10
 t+1 and ANNFCSTERR_10 t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and 
other control variables.  Panel B presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_90
 t+1 and ANNFCSTERR_90 t+1 on UPDATER 
or BB_WORDS and other control variables.  ESHOCK_10
 t+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the bottom 10 percent of the 
distribution of ESHOCK
 t+1, and zero otherwise.   ESHOCK_90 t+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the top 10 percent of 
the distribution of ESHOCK
 t+1, and zero otherwise.  ESHOCK t+1 is forecast error for the second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update 
using predicted earnings from a cross-sectional regression model.  ANNFCSTERR_10
 t+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in 
the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ANNFCSTERR
 t+1, and zero otherwise.   ANNFCSTERR _90 t+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an 
observation is in the top 10 percent of the distribution of ANNFCSTERR
 t+1, and zero otherwise.  ANNFCSTERR t+1 is forecast error for the second 
fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update using the first mean forecast of the year.  All other variables were defined in Table 3 with the 
exception that they are now measured on an annual basis.  P-values (to the right of coefficient estimates) are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
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Table 11 (Continued) 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER 0.1903 (0.218) -0.0341 (0.803)
BB_WORDS 0.0531 (0.104) -0.0645 (0.050)
LMVE -0.1485 (0.016) -0.1471 (0.017) -0.0287 (0.691) -0.0323 (0.657)
BTM 0.3120 (0.075) 0.3218 (0.068) 1.5069 (0.000) 1.5024 (0.000)
STDROE 0.0440 (0.370) 0.0477 (0.332) 0.0382 (0.568) 0.0401 (0.546)
CHGEARN 0.0325 (0.051) 0.0330 (0.046) -0.0119 (0.467) -0.0132 (0.429)
PRIORKLOSS 1.3625 (0.000) 1.3405 (0.000) -0.3189 (0.181) -0.2512 (0.294)
-0.1587 (0.127) -0.1283 (0.217)
0.0253 (0.000) 0.0251 (0.000)
CONSTANT -1.9034 (0.000) -1.9607 (0.000) -3.5746 (0.000) -3.4830 (0.000)
N 2,248        2,248        3,092         3,092         
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK_10t+1 ESHOCK_10t+1 ANNFCSTERR_10t+1ANNFCSTERR_10t+1
Panel A: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCKt+1 or 
ANNFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 78 
 
 
Table 11 (Continued) 
 
Variable
UPDATER 0.3673 (0.018) 0.1901 (0.144)
BB_WORDS 0.0768 (0.024) 0.0253 (0.395)
LMVE -0.4939 (0.000) -0.4920 (0.000) 0.1920 (0.008) 0.1910 (0.008)
BTM -0.3288 (0.191) -0.3285 (0.194) 0.3835 (0.015) 0.3890 (0.014)
STDROE 0.0977 (0.088) 0.1030 (0.073) 0.0802 (0.102) 0.0820 (0.092)
CHGEARN -0.1178 (0.000) -0.1179 (0.000) -0.0196 (0.433) -0.0196 (0.434)
PRIORKLOSS -0.1705 (0.398) -0.1831 (0.368) 0.5735 (0.002) 0.5880 (0.001)
-0.1576 (0.157) -0.1510 (0.179)
0.0181 (0.000) 0.0181 (0.000)
CONSTANT 0.9160 (0.203) 0.8880 (0.221) -4.3352 (0.000) -4.3158 (0.000)
N 2,248        2,248        3,092         3,092         
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK_90t+1 ESHOCK_90t+1 ANNFCSTERR_90t+1ANNFCSTERR_90t+1
Panel B: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the top 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCKt+1 or 
ANNFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 12.  Regressions of CARf on UPDATER or BB_WORDS 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of CARf on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control variables, excluding quarterly 
updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  Columns (1) and (2) present regression results for tests of H1 
using Equation (1).  Columns (3)-(6) include regression results for tests of H2 using Equation (2).  All variables were defined in Table 3.  P-values 
(to the right of coefficient estimates ) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
   
 
Variable
UPDATER -0.0031 (0.034) -0.0064 (0.075) -0.0080 (0.040)
BB_WORDS -0.0008 (0.049) -0.0013 (0.215) -0.0025 (0.032)
LMVE -0.0007 (0.066) -0.0007 (0.064) -0.0005 (0.159) -0.0005 (0.154) -0.0009 (0.048) -0.0010 (0.046)
BTM 0.0133 (0.000) 0.0133 (0.000) 0.0134 (0.000) 0.0133 (0.000) 0.0133 (0.000) 0.0132 (0.000)
NEWS 0.0125 (0.015) 0.0126 (0.015) 0.0127 (0.014) 0.0128 (0.013) 0.0129 (0.012) 0.0130 (0.012)
CARea -0.0218 (0.009) -0.0219 (0.009) -0.0217 (0.010) -0.0219 (0.009) -0.0220 (0.009) -0.0222 (0.008)
INSTPERC -0.0004 (0.062) -0.0004 (0.120)
INSTPERC*UPDATER 0.0006 (0.269)
INSTPERC*BB_WORDS 0.0001 (0.568)
NUMEST 0.0003 (0.704) -0.0002 (0.872)
NUMEST*UPDATER 0.0026 (0.158)
NUMEST*BB_WORDS 0.0009 (0.109)
CONSTANT 0.0013 (0.681) 0.0017 (0.595) 0.0023 (0.475) 0.0027 (0.422) 0.0026 (0.426) 0.0040 (0.250)
N 6,498        6,498        6,498        6,498        6,498        6,498        
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole Sample INSTPERC Interaction NUMEST Interaction
CARf CARf CARf CARf CARf CARf
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Table 13.  Regressions of QFCSTERRt+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of QFCSTERRt+1 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS and other control variables, excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of the 
most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  All variables were defined in Table 3.  P-values (to 
the right of coefficient estimates ) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by firm.   
   
 
 
 
 
Variable
UPDATER -0.0321 (0.001)
BB_WORDS -0.0059 (0.057)
LMVE 0.0082 (0.061) 0.0083 (0.059)
BTM -0.1735 (0.000) -0.1742 (0.000)
STDROE -0.0088 (0.007) -0.0091 (0.005)
CHGEARN 0.0058 (0.003) 0.0058 (0.003)
PRIORQLOSS -0.0122 (0.422) -0.0136 (0.377)
NUMEST -0.0075 (0.312) -0.0080 (0.285)
PRICE -0.0008 (0.023) -0.0008 (0.023)
CONSTANT 0.0556 (0.044) 0.0572 (0.038)
N 6,482        6,482        
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06
QFCSTERRt+1 QFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2)
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Table 14.  Regressions of ESHOCK, ANNFCSTERR, ESHOCKt+1 and ANNFCSTERR t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from regressions of ESHOCK and ANNFCSTERR on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control 
variables, excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  Panel B presents coefficient 
estimates from regressions of ESHOCKt+1 and ANNFCSTERRt+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control variables, excluding quarterly 
updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  ESHOCK is forecast error for the current year using predicted 
earnings from a cross-sectional regression model.  ANNFCSTERR is forecast error for the current year using the first mean forecast of the year.  
All other variables were defined in Table 3 with the exception that they are now measured on an annual basis.  P-values (to the right of coefficient 
estimates) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER -0.0188 (0.000) -0.1254 (0.001)
BB_WORDS -0.0059 (0.000) -0.0320 (0.008)
LMVE 0.0049 (0.007) 0.0048 (0.008) 0.0923 (0.000) 0.0930 (0.000)
BTM -0.0358 (0.000) -0.0360 (0.000) -0.9041 (0.000) -0.9060 (0.000)
STDROE -0.0010 (0.664) -0.0011 (0.643) -0.0291 (0.108) -0.0300 (0.099)
CHGEARN 0.0088 (0.000) 0.0088 (0.000) 0.0401 (0.000) 0.0401 (0.000)
PRIORKLOSS -0.0008 (0.941) 0.0001 (0.992) -0.0516 (0.444) -0.0512 (0.453)
NUMEST -0.1405 (0.000) -0.1423 (0.000)
PRICE -0.0054 (0.002) -0.0054 (0.002)
CONSTANT -0.0143 (0.378) -0.0108 (0.504) 0.1344 (0.312) 0.1421 (0.287)
N 2,327        2,327        3,389        3,389        
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20
Panel A: The first fiscal year end following a quarterly update
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK ESHOCK ANNFCSTERR ANNFCSTERR
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Panel B: The second fiscal year end following a quarterly update
Variable
UPDATER 0.0079 (0.138) 0.0189 (0.737)
BB_WORDS 0.0027 (0.146) 0.0300 (0.059)
LMVE -0.0045 (0.021) -0.0045 (0.022) 0.0854 (0.001) 0.0857 (0.001)
BTM -0.0277 (0.003) -0.0276 (0.003) -0.8636 (0.000) -0.8647 (0.000)
STDROE 0.0016 (0.530) 0.0016 (0.529) -0.0282 (0.168) -0.0296 (0.152)
CHGEARN -0.0047 (0.003) -0.0047 (0.004) 0.0097 (0.335) 0.0097 (0.335)
PRIORKLOSS -0.0463 (0.000) -0.0467 (0.000) 0.0940 (0.195) 0.0771 (0.286)
NUMEST -0.0568 (0.155) -0.0635 (0.109)
PRICE -0.0095 (0.000) -0.0094 (0.000)
CONSTANT 0.0407 (0.020) 0.0389 (0.027) -0.1170 (0.473) -0.1481 (0.363)
N 1,795        1,795        2,598        2,598        
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCKt+1 ESHOCKt+1 ANNFCSTERRt+1 ANNFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 84 
 
 
Table 15.  Regressions of QFCSTERR_10t+1 and QFCSTERR_90t+1 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of QFCSTERR_10t+1 on UPDATER 
or BB_WORDS and other control variables, excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of 
the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  Panel B presents coefficient estimates from logit 
regressions of QFCSTERR_90
 t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control variables, 
excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors 
disclosure.  All variables were defined in Table 3.  P-values (to the right of coefficient estimates ) 
are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER 0.3524 (0.002)
BB_WORDS 0.0603 (0.103)
LMVE 0.0044 (0.946) 0.0034 (0.957)
BTM 2.1575 (0.000) 2.1648 (0.000)
STDROE 0.1371 (0.008) 0.1395 (0.007)
CHGEARN -0.0576 (0.010) -0.0575 (0.010)
PRIORQLOSS 0.4049 (0.030) 0.4166 (0.028)
NUMEST -0.1865 (0.040) -0.1799 (0.048)
PRICE 0.0240 (0.000) 0.0239 (0.000)
CONSTANT -4.2047 (0.000) -4.2127 (0.000)
N 6,482        6,482        
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.11
QFCSTERR_10t+1 QFCSTERR_10t+1
Panel A: Dependent variable is an indicator variable representing the bottom 
10 percent of the distribution of QFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2)
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Table 15 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Variable
UPDATER 0.0635 (0.596)
BB_WORDS 0.0285 (0.447)
LMVE 0.2972 (0.000) 0.2968 (0.000)
BTM 1.1530 (0.000) 1.1525 (0.000)
STDROE 0.1142 (0.001) 0.1143 (0.001)
CHGEARN 0.0119 (0.571) 0.0120 (0.568)
PRIORQLOSS 0.7119 (0.000) 0.7055 (0.000)
NUMEST -0.4994 (0.000) -0.5004 (0.000)
PRICE 0.0248 (0.000) 0.0249 (0.000)
CONSTANT -5.1773 (0.000) -5.1928 (0.000)
N 6,482        6,482        
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.08
QFCSTERR_90t+1 QFCSTERR_90t+1
Panel B: Dependent variable is an indicator variable representing the top 10 
percent of the distribution of QFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2)
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Table 16.  Regressions of ESHOCK_10, ANNFCSTERR_10, ESHOCK_90, and ANNFCSTERR_90 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_10 and ANNFCSTERR_10 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other 
control variables, excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  Panel B presents 
coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_90 and ANNFCSTERR_90 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control variables, 
excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  ESHOCK_10 is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if an observation is in the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK, and zero otherwise.   ESHOCK_90 is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if an observation is in the top 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK, and zero otherwise.  ESHOCK is forecast error for the current year 
using predicted earnings from a cross-sectional regression model.  ANNFCSTERR_10 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the 
bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ANNFCSTERR, and zero otherwise.   ANNFCSTERR _90 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an 
observation is in the top 10 percent of the distribution of ANNFCSTERR, and zero otherwise.  ANNFCSTERR is forecast error for the current year 
using the first mean forecast of the year.  All other variables were defined in Table 3 with the exception that they are now measured on an annual 
basis.  P-values (to the right of coefficient estimates) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER 0.5241 (0.001) 0.4394 (0.001)
BB_WORDS 0.1221 (0.007) 0.0948 (0.026)
LMVE -0.4083 (0.000) -0.4069 (0.000) -0.1140 (0.138) -0.1143 (0.135)
BTM 0.4426 (0.019) 0.4414 (0.020) 2.0513 (0.000) 2.0510 (0.000)
STDROE 0.1120 (0.006) 0.1167 (0.004) 0.1131 (0.117) 0.1149 (0.115)
CHGEARN -0.1237 (0.000) -0.1241 (0.000) -0.0858 (0.000) -0.0858 (0.000)
PRIORKLOSS 0.9079 (0.000) 0.9081 (0.000) 0.4100 (0.037) 0.4170 (0.034)
NUMEST 0.1632 (0.159) 0.1736 (0.132)
PRICE 0.0278 (0.000) 0.0277 (0.000)
CONSTANT -0.3711 (0.500) -0.3871 (0.482) -4.4777 (0.000) -4.4798 (0.000)
N 2,327        2,327        3,389        3,389        
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.20
Panel A: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK or 
ANNFCSTERR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK_10 ESHOCK_10 ANNFCSTERR_10 ANNFCSTERR_10
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER -0.0981 (0.562) -0.1362 (0.322)
BB_WORDS -0.0477 (0.334) -0.0537 (0.194)
LMVE -0.3151 (0.000) -0.3162 (0.000) 0.4612 (0.000) 0.4626 (0.000)
BTM -1.0443 (0.000) -1.0489 (0.000) -0.0347 (0.825) -0.0358 (0.820)
STDROE 0.1072 (0.025) 0.1075 (0.025) 0.0602 (0.234) 0.0600 (0.236)
CHGEARN 0.0549 (0.033) 0.0548 (0.033) 0.0637 (0.021) 0.0635 (0.021)
PRIORKLOSS 0.9903 (0.000) 1.0082 (0.000) 0.9574 (0.000) 0.9698 (0.000)
NUMEST -0.6648 (0.000) -0.6629 (0.000)
PRICE 0.0210 (0.000) 0.0209 (0.000)
CONSTANT 0.1728 (0.795) 0.2210 (0.742) -5.2334 (0.000) -5.2104 (0.000)
N 2,327        2,327        3,389        3,389        
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
ESHOCK_90 ESHOCK_90 ANNFCSTERR_90 ANNFCSTERR_90
Panel B: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the top 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK or 
ANNFCSTERR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
Current Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
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Table 17.  Regressions of ESHOCK_10t+1, ANNFCSTERR_10 t+1, ESHOCK_90 t+1, and ANNFCSTERR_90 t+1 on UPDATER or 
BB_WORDS 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_10
 t+1 and ANNFCSTERR_10 t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and 
other control variables, excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  Panel B presents 
coefficient estimates from logit regressions of ESHOCK_90
 t+1 and ANNFCSTERR_90 t+1 on UPDATER or BB_WORDS and other control 
variables, excluding quarterly updates larger than 95 percent of the most recent annual Risk Factors disclosure.  ESHOCK_10
 t+1 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK
 t+1, and zero otherwise.   ESHOCK_90 t+1 is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the top 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCK
 t+1, and zero otherwise.  ESHOCK t+1 is 
forecast error for the second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update using predicted earnings from a cross-sectional regression model.  
ANNFCSTERR_10
 t+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ANNFCSTERR t+1, and 
zero otherwise.   ANNFCSTERR _90
 t+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an observation is in the top 10 percent of the distribution of 
ANNFCSTERR
 t+1, and zero otherwise.  ANNFCSTERR t+1 is forecast error for the second fiscal year end following a Risk Factor update using the 
first mean forecast of the year.  All other variables were defined in Table 3 with the exception that they are now measured on an annual basis.  
P-values (to the right of coefficient estimates) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
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Table 17 (Continued) 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER 0.0014 (0.994) 0.0745 (0.628)
BB_WORDS 0.0075 (0.882) -0.0633 (0.194)
LMVE -0.1687 (0.014) -0.1686 (0.014) -0.0447 (0.555) -0.0417 (0.586)
BTM 0.3437 (0.073) 0.3440 (0.072) 1.4980 (0.000) 1.5138 (0.000)
STDROE 0.0722 (0.155) 0.0719 (0.157) -0.0196 (0.801) -0.0132 (0.863)
CHGEARN 0.0313 (0.115) 0.0313 (0.114) -0.0178 (0.377) -0.0186 (0.368)
PRIORKLOSS 1.0784 (0.000) 1.0735 (0.000) -0.1525 (0.565) -0.1077 (0.686)
NUMEST -0.0975 (0.383) -0.0779 (0.485)
PRICE 0.0254 (0.000) 0.0250 (0.000)
CONSTANT -1.5298 (0.005) -1.5420 (0.005) -3.6706 (0.000) -3.6186 (0.000)
N 1,795        1,795        2,598         2,598         
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
ESHOCK_10t+1 ESHOCK_10t+1 ANNFCSTERR_10t+1ANNFCSTERR_10t+1
Panel A: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the bottom 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCKt+1 or 
ANNFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Tabel 17 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable
UPDATER 0.2424 (0.151) 0.2176 (0.131)
BB_WORDS 0.0528 (0.318) 0.0407 (0.338)
LMVE -0.5688 (0.000) -0.5675 (0.000) 0.2789 (0.000) 0.2771 (0.000)
BTM -0.5163 (0.071) -0.5183 (0.071) 0.4268 (0.011) 0.4324 (0.009)
STDROE 0.1026 (0.087) 0.1053 (0.077) 0.0876 (0.085) 0.0894 (0.077)
CHGEARN -0.1105 (0.001) -0.1108 (0.001) -0.0077 (0.800) -0.0077 (0.802)
PRIORKLOSS -0.1430 (0.539) -0.1312 (0.575) 0.4843 (0.023) 0.4989 (0.018)
NUMEST -0.2378 (0.047) -0.2316 (0.055)
PRICE 0.0146 (0.000) 0.0146 (0.000)
CONSTANT 1.6232 (0.027) 1.6142 (0.029) -4.7134 (0.000) -4.7041 (0.000)
N 1,795        1,795        2,598         2,598         
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.04
ESHOCK_90t+1 ESHOCK_90t+1 ANNFCSTERR_90t+1ANNFCSTERR_90t+1
Panel B: Dependent variables are indicator variables representing the top 10 percent of the distribution of ESHOCKt+1 or 
ANNFCSTERRt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
NEXT Fiscal Year End Following 
Quarterly Update
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